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THE LEONARD PELTIER CASE: AN ARGUMENT IN 
SUPPORT OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY BASED ON NORMS 
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
Joseph Ezzo*   
Introduction 
No, I’m not the guilty one here; I’m not the one who should be 
called a criminal—white racist America is the criminal for the 
destruction of our lands and my people; to hide your guilt from 
the decent human beings in America and around the world, you 
will sentence me to two consecutive life terms without any 
hesitation.1 
Leonard Peltier, an American Indian Movement (AIM) leader, spoke 
these words while standing before the trial judge awaiting his sentence six 
weeks after being convicted of the first-degree murders of two FBI agents. 
He concluded his statement by saying, “The only thing I’m guilty of and 
which I was convicted for was being Chippewa and Sioux blood and for 
believing in our sacred religion.”2 Undaunted, trial judge, Paul Benson, 
responded, “You profess to be an activist for your people, but you are a 
disservice to Native Americans.”3 He then sentenced Peltier to two 
consecutive life sentences.4 The date was June 1, 1977; Peltier was thirty-
two years old at the time.5 Today he is sixty-nine, in failing health, and 
remains in federal prison for the murders of FBI Agents Jack Coler and 
Ronald Williams.6  
                                                                                                                 
* Pima County Public Defender’s Office, Tucson, Arizona. J.D., University of Arizona 
James E. Rogers College of Law (2012); Ph.D. (Anthropology), University of Wisconsin 
(1991); M.A. (Anthropology), University of Arizona (1984); B.A. (Anthropology), 
Vanderbilt University (1979). 
 1. JIM MESSERSCHMIDT, THE TRIAL OF LEONARD PELTIER 114-15 (1983). 
 2. Id. at 116. 
 3. Id.  
 4. Id. 
 5. See Jeremy Strathman, Leonard Peltier Trial: A Chronology, FAMOUS TRIALS, 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/peltier/peltierchrono.html (last visited Dec. 8, 
2013). 
 6. See Jack Healey, Human Rights Are Beyond Politics – Justice Should Be Too, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 24, 2012, 9:29 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jack-healey/ 
human-rights-are-beyond-p_b_2357065.html.  
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To some, Leonard Peltier is a hero; a warrior; a political prisoner; and a 
modern symbol of centuries of discrimination, persecution, and 
marginalization of the American Indian by the United States government 
and its institutions.7 Support for executive clemency has come from all over 
the globe, from organizations such as Amnesty International and the 
American Indian Movement, to individuals such as Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu, the Dalai Lama, and the Archbishop of Canterbury.8 When President 
Bill Clinton was considering granting Peltier executive clemency, the 
petition included an endorsement from these organizations as well as the 
European Parliament.9  
But to others, Peltier is a cold-blooded, amoral murderer who cleverly 
manipulated the media and played upon public sympathy to create a 
fictitious, larger-than-life persona,10 to wit: 
Because of his own growing self-indulgence and notoriety, 
something greater, albeit more remarkable, was needed. The 
Myth of Leonard Peltier needed the Agents' deaths to be 
something other than just a coincidence. Unless it was otherwise, 
a haphazard encounter would diminish his developing mythical 
stature. It would not have allowed him, in retrospect, to rise to 
the occasion and lead his People out of harm's way. . . . Leonard 
Peltier is no longer the same person he was on June 26, 1975. 
That American Indian does not exist; just the Myth of Leonard 
Peltier remains. Only the Myth can now say that he never 
regretted he stood up and protected his people, and that the 
murder of the agents that day was not a crime.11 
Wherever the reality may ultimately lie, Peltier’s case is especially 
troubling to anyone concerned with justice and human rights. This article 
                                                                                                                 
 7. There are many websites devoted to having Peltier freed from prison. See, e.g., 
LEONARD PELTIER DEFENSE COMMITTEE, http://www.leonardpeltier.org (last visited Aug. 23, 
2013); LEONARD PELTIER DEFENSE OFFENSE COMMITTEE, http://www.whoisleonardpeltier. 
info (last visited Aug. 23, 2013). 
 8. Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA Patriot Act in the 
Context of COINTELPRO and the Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REV. 
1051, 1086 n.163 (2002); see also AMNESTY INT’L, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST 
THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THE AMERICAS 84-86 (1992). 
 9. Saito, supra note 8, at 1086 n.163. 
 10. An entire website is devoted to seeing that Peltier remains in prison. See NO PAROLE 
PELTIER ASS’N, http://www.noparolepeltier.com (last visited Aug. 23, 2013). 
 11. Ed Woods, The Myth of Leonard Peltier, NO PAROLE PELTIER ASS’N (Nov. 14, 
2000), http://www.noparolepeltier.com/myth.html. 
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reviews and analyzes his case in light of possible constitutional and 
international human rights violations during trial. It concludes with an 
examination of whether Peltier is entitled to executive clemency.  
I. The Essential Facts 
On June 25, 1975, FBI Special Agents Jack Coler and Ron Williams 
were in Oglala, South Dakota, along with a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) 
policeman, Robert Ecoffey, and another BIA officer, Glenn Littlebird.12 
They were searching for AIM member Jimmy Eagle on an outstanding 
warrant for robbery.13 After asking around at a few residences, they were 
eventually told Eagle had left in a red pickup truck.14 Shortly afterward, the 
men spotted three Indian youths walking toward the highway and detained 
them thinking one of them might be Eagle.15 The officers found a rolled-up 
towel containing an ammunition clip on one of the youths and took all three 
to the Oglala jail pending identification.16 They were released after being 
identified as Michael Anderson, Wilford Draper, and Norman Charles, 
three members of AIM.17  
The three then went to the Jumping Bull Compound where a number of 
AIM members, including Peltier, had gathered to protect members and 
sympathizers who were being terrorized by Dick Wilson, tribal council 
chairman of the Pine Ridge Reservation, along with his brutal tribal police 
force known as the GOONs (Guardians of the Oglala Nation).18 
Coler and Williams entered the Pine Ridge Reservation the next 
morning, June 26, 1975, to renew their search for Eagle.19 They followed a 
vehicle to the Jumping Bull Compound where the vehicle stopped.20 The 
vehicle was red and white, but whether it was a pickup truck like the 
                                                                                                                 
 12. MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 1, at 39. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 39, 42. 
 15. Id. at 42. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See id.; PETER MATTHIESSEN, IN THE SPIRIT OF CRAZY HORSE 129 (1983); Douglas 
O. Linder, The Leonard Peltier Trial, FAMOUS TRIALS (2006), http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/ 
projects/ftrials/peltier/peltieraccount.html. Wilson was virulently anti-AIM and outlawed not 
only the movement on the Pine Ridge Reservation but also the sun dance. MATTHIESSEN, 
supra, at 129, 131. His violent tactics resulted in the Pine Ridge Reservation having the 
highest crime rate in the entire United States. Id. at 134. Wilson and the GOONs worked 
closely with the FBI in early 1975 to rid the reservation of AIM activity. Id. at 133. 
 19. MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 1, at 44. 
 20. Id. 
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vehicle in which Eagle had purportedly left in the day before remains in 
controversy.21 Shortly thereafter, a firefight ensued and both agents were 
killed along with AIM member, Joe Stuntz.22  
Coler and Williams had communicated by radio that they were following 
the vehicle, were being shot at, and subsequently, were needing 
assistance.23 As other agents arrived on the scene, they encountered fire and 
had to retreat.24 Additional agents and BIA officers arrived throughout the 
afternoon. With the help of a local, they were able to negotiate a cease-fire 
and make it to the dead agents’ cars.25 After negotiations, the officers began 
an assault on the compound with tear gas; however, the buildings were 
empty because the remaining AIM shooters were in the hills about a 
quarter-mile away.26 By dusk the FBI had secured the Jumping Bull 
Compound, and the AIM members involved in the firefight had fled.27  
Ultimately four AIM members-–Bob Robideau, Dino Butler, Jimmy 
Eagle, and Leonard Peltier–-were indicted for the agents’ murders. 
Robideau and Butler were tried together in federal court in Cedar Rapids, 
Iowa. The defendants argued self-defense and were acquitted in July 
1976.28 Charges were eventually dropped against Eagle when it became 
clear he was not present at the firefight.29  
Peltier fled to Canada in February 1976, where he was subsequently 
arrested and held.30 The U.S. government successfully extradited him back 
to the United States, in part by using affidavits by Myrtle Poor Bear, an 
Indian woman who claimed to have witnessed the firefights.31 After a five 
and a half week trial in the federal district court of Fargo, North Dakota, he 
was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to two 
consecutive life sentences.32 
The trial was complex and contentious, with both the prosecution and the 
defense making claims that various actions during trial were prejudicial. 
The inconsistencies and evidence of government misconduct will be 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Id. at 42, 44. 
 22. Id. at 48. 
 23. Id. at 44. 
 24. Id. at 45. 
 25. Id. at 48. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 48-49. 
 28. Id. at 38. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 31. 
 31. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 32. MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 1, at 38, 116. 
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explored in various sections of this article. However, before examining 
these points of controversy, it is necessary to present the FBI’s perspective 
on Peltier and the Pine Ridge Reservation murders.  
II. FBI Account of the Firefight and Trial 
The FBI’s account of the murders highlights an increase in crime on the 
Pine Ridge Reservation attributed to the factionalism that existed between 
Indian traditionalists and AIM members.33 The description of Peltier’s AIM 
membership focuses solely on his criminal activity.34 From the viewpoint of 
the FBI, agents Coler and Williams unwittingly entered a climate of fear 
and violence created by AIM’s presence on the reservation.35 
The agents were alleged to have been on the reservation to serve Jimmy 
Eagle with an arrest warrant. However, the account does not discuss how 
the FBI obtained information as to Eagle’s whereabouts, nor is there 
mention that Eagle was anywhere near the reservation on the date of the 
incident.36  
Once on the reservation, the agents were allegedly told that Eagle had 
just left the area in a red vehicle. The FBI’s version of the reservation 
murders (which they came to refer to as RESMURS) acknowledged there 
was a discrepancy in what FBI agents heard in radio transmission from 
Coler and Williams regarding a red vehicle.37 However, the account also 
asserts that the one vehicle present at the Jumping Bull Compound was 
Peltier’s red and white suburban.38  
The FBI account goes on to state that the ensuing firefight lasted about 
ten minutes, during which time both agents fired no more than five rounds, 
whereas their vehicles alone had 125 bullet holes.39 Agent Williams radioed 
to other FBI agents that both he and Coler had been hit.40 Once agents 
arrived on the scene, they were pinned down with sporadic “sniper fire” 
such that they were not able to recover the bodies of Coler and Williams 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See The RESMURS Case, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, MINNEAPOLIS DIVISION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/minneapolis/about-us/history-1/the-resmurs-case (last visited Sept. 9, 
2013). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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until approximately 4:25 that afternoon.41 Agents noted that both had been 
killed at close range with shots to the head by a .223 bullet, and that three 
.223 bullets had struck the agents.42 Peltier was identified by witnesses as 
the only person in possession of a weapon that would fire a .223 type bullet 
at the time of the murders–-an AR-15 rifle.43  
After the capture of Bob Robideau and Dino Butler, the two were tried 
for murder in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.44 The government’s top two witnesses, 
Michael Anderson and Angie Long Visitor, were unavailable to testify 
because neither witness could be located.45 Additionally, the judge recessed 
the trial for ten days after the government rested its case to attend a judicial 
conference, thus allowing the defense extra time to prepare its case.46  
The defense was also permitted to present the jury with a theory that the 
“climate of fear” on the Pine Ridge Reservation was primarily due to FBI 
activity.47 Robideau and Butler were both acquitted by reason of self-
defense, and the jury foreman stated that the “climate of fear” theory played 
a role in the verdict.48 In contrast, during Peltier’s trial, the trial judge 
excluded much of the FBI background information under a requirement that 
all evidence be directly relevant to proving Peltier’s guilt or innocence.49 
In describing the Peltier trial, the FBI account states, “Peltier had been 
indicted not only for the murders, but also on the grounds that he may have 
been an aider and abettor in the murders.”50 The account also refers a 
number of times to “witnesses,”51 presumably meaning the three youths 
picked up by Coler and Williams the day before the murders: Michael 
Anderson, Wilford Draper, and Norman Brown.52 The account states 
unequivocally that the firearms and toolmark identification of the AR-15 
rifle supposedly used by Peltier during the firefight was matched to the .223 
shell casings at the site of the agents’ cars.53  
                                                                                                                 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 1, at 42. 
 53. The RESMURS Case, supra note 33. For purposes of this article, the term “firearms 
and toolmark identification” is used instead of “ballistics analysis.” “Ballistics” has come to 
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The FBI concluded its account of the Peltier case by noting how 
generous the government was to Peltier throughout the legal proceedings, 
as if this treatment not only gave Peltier an unfair advantage but was also 
prejudicial against the government. The account states, 
Normally, a federal criminal defendant is entitled to a single 
court-appointed attorney chosen by rotation. Peltier received five 
lawyers—-two as trial attorneys and three as investigators. All 
were chosen by Peltier, rather than the normal rotation process, 
and all were paid for by the government. The defense received 
almost double the normal number of preemptory challenges 
during jury selection. Peltier's lawyers were allowed to 
personally question the jury, which is highly unusual in federal 
criminal cases. The trial court provided daily transcripts of 
testimony to the defense, a very expensive measure that is rarely 
allowed. After his conviction, Peltier was allowed to dismiss 
four of his five trial attorneys and hire new ones for his 
appeals.54 
III. The Points of Controversy 
A number of points of controversy frustrate a fair and comprehensive 
understanding of the Peltier case. This section will focus on those points 
that pertain to conditions and conduct surrounding the trial, which include: 
Peltier’s extradition from Canada, repeated denials of offers of proof, 
possible coerced testimony of AIM members, firearms and toolmark 
identification, discrepancies in vehicle description, and pathology reports 
on agents Coler and Williams. Before reviewing these points, it is necessary 
to put them in context by providing a brief treatment of the relationship 
between the FBI and AIM, as well as the attention paid to Peltier prior to 
the firefight. 
A. The FBI and the American Indian Movement 
The FBI’s attitude toward American Indians in the 1960s and 1970s 
might well be summed up in the words of Norman Zigrossi, who served as 
Assistant Special Agent in charge of the FBI’s South Dakota office: “They 
                                                                                                                 
be used to describe firearms and toolmark identification in general but actually refers to the 
motion that firearms create when discharging a projectile. See Adina Schwartz, Challenging 
Firearms and Toolmark Identification – Part One, CHAMPION, Oct. 2008, at 10, 11 
[hereinafter Schwartz, Challenging Firearms]. 
 54. The RESMURS Case, supra note 33. 
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[the Indians] are a conquered nation, and when you are conquered, the 
people you are conquered by dictate your future. . . . [The FBI must 
function as] a colonial police force.”55  
AIM originated in Minneapolis during the summer of 1968 when 
approximately 200 Indians convened and voiced their frustration over 
federal Indian policy, discrimination, reservation poverty, and 
unemployment.56 They desired to overcome these obstacles and reclaim 
their destiny.57 In particular, they were frustrated with the continual 
abrogation of treaty rights by the U.S. government and wanted these rights 
re-established, enforced, and respected.58  
In 1972, AIM members went to Washington, D.C. to present President 
Nixon with a manifesto entitled, “Trail of Broken Treaties 20-Point 
Position Paper.”59 The manifesto dealt largely with the restoration of 
constitutional treaty-making, the enforcement of current treaties, the 
governing of Indians through treaties, and government investigations into 
broken treaties.60  
This coincided with the election of Dick Wilson as tribal council chair of 
the Pine Ridge Reservation. Wilson allegedly rigged the election and 
openly persecuted individuals sympathetic to AIM.61 These events triggered 
a protest by AIM in which members seized control of a small community 
near Wounded Knee, South Dakota in February 1973.62 This act brought a 
swift response from the FBI, which had already begun monitoring AIM 
activities, and a seventy-two day standoff ensued.63  
                                                                                                                 
 55. WARD CHURCHILL & JIM VANDER WALL, THE COINTELPRO PAPERS: DOCUMENTS 
FROM THE FBI’S SECRET WARS AGAINST DOMESTIC DISSENT 231 (1990) (alteration in 
original). 
 56. American Indian Movement, MINN. HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.mnhs.org/library/tips/ 
history_topics/93aim.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2013). 
 57. See id. 
 58. See CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, supra note 55, at 233. 
59. See id. at 234. 
 60. See AM. INDIAN MOVEMENT, TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES: 20-POINT POSITION PAPER 
(Oct. 1972), available at http://www.aimovement.org/archives/index.html. 
 61. MATTHIESSEN, supra note 18, at 61-62. According to Matthiessen, after the incident 
at Wounded Knee, Wilson declared “all-out war” on AIM and its sympathizers on the Pine 
Ridge Reservation, where AIM had been effectively outlawed. Id. at 101.  
 62. VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES 71-72 (1974). 
 63. Id. at 79. The October 17, 1973 murder of AIM activist Pedro Bissonnette on the 
Pine Ridge Reservation and the continued harassment of AIM members and sympathizers 
brought increased tension to the Indians of South Dakota and increasing involvement of the 
BIA police and the FBI. Id. at 99-101. More than two thousand people attended 
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During this time, Russell Means, an AIM leader, announced on national 
television that the Oglala Sioux Nation had been formed and was 
independent of the United States.64 He argued that the 1868 treaty with the 
U.S. government gave the Oglala Sioux the right to determine its borders 
and that anyone who violated the borders would be shot.65 Meanwhile, the 
FBI had recruited informants to infiltrate AIM. One of them, Doug 
Durham, held a number of prominent positions within AIM.66 Three years 
later, Durham testified before a Senate subcommittee on his activities. He 
claimed that AIM was responsible for a large number of deaths of Indians 
and non-Indians, that it had powerful Communist ties to various 
governments (including Fidel Castro) and organizations, and that its 
ultimate goal was to overthrow the U.S. government.67 
Although the FBI supposedly dismantled its Counterintelligence 
Program (known as COINTELPRO) in 1971, counterintelligence operations 
against social and political groups continued unabated throughout the 
1970s.68 By early 1973, the FBI was closely monitoring developments 
                                                                                                                 
Bissonnette’s funeral, which was guarded by AIM security patrols, including a West Coast 
detail headed by Jim Robideau and Leonard Peltier. Id. at 102-03. 
 64. Id. at 77-78. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Revolutionary Activities Within the United States: The American Indian Movement: 
Rep. of the Subcomm. to Investigate the Admin. of the Internal Sec. Act & Other Internal 
Sec. Laws of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 5 (1976) (statement of Douglas 
Durham, FBI). 
 67. See id. at 2-4. The purpose of the hearing, according to subcommittee chairman, 
Senator James Eastland, was to determine “whether there is, in fact, reason for believing that 
the American Indian Movement is a radical subversive organization rather than an 
organization committed to improving the lot of the American Indians.” Id. at 2. The 
subcommittee was also looking for “demonstrable ties” between AIM and “the various 
Communist movements that exist in our country.” Id.  
 68. See BRIAN GLICK, WAR AT HOME: COVERT ACTION AGAINST U.S. ACTIVISTS AND 
WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 7-10 (1989). COINTELPRO encouraged FBI field offices to 
create and implement “schemes to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise 
neutralize” specific targeted groups. Id. at 9 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Field office agents were instructed to work with local police and prosecutors and to 
seek out friendly media for propaganda purposes. Id. Four primary methods of operations 
were employed: (1) “[i]nfiltration,” used mainly to “discredit and disrupt,” and at times for 
the FBI to brand genuine activists as undercover agents; (2) outside “[p]sychological 
[w]arfare,” which included publishing false stories in media, disseminating phony pamphlets 
and literature, and harassing employers and landlords of activists; (3) “[h]arassment 
[t]hrough the [l]egal [s]ystem,” using perjured testimony and false information to portray 
activists as criminals and as a pretext to arrest and incarcerate them; and (4) the use of 
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within AIM.69 A memo on “Extremist Matters” from the Denver field 
office, dated January 12, 1973, indicated that the office had begun 
collecting information on those they identified as being leaders within 
AIM.70 On May 4, 1973, the FBI’s Acting Director issued a teletype to the 
Special Agent in Charge (SAC), detailing the need to investigate “all AIM 
members and unaffiliated Indians arrested or involved in takeover of 
Wounded Knee”71 and that a “forceful and penetrative interview program 
of individual activists should be instituted.”72 
In an October 31, 1973 memo out of the Albuquerque office, the FBI 
described AIM’s occupation of Wounded Knee as possibly violating “Title 
18, U.S. Code, Section 2383 (Rebellion or Insurrection) or 2384 (Seditious 
Conspiracy).”73 By April 1975, the FBI had produced a position paper 
bearing as the subject “THE USE OF SPECIAL AGENTS OF THE FBI IN 
A PARAMILITARY LAW ENOFORCEMENT OPERATION IN THE 
INDIAN COUNTRY.”74 The report states that “[t]he FBI was instructed by 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) in the latter part of 1972 to conduct 
extremist and criminal investigations pertaining to AIM.”75 Much of the 
rest of the report documents the difficulties the FBI experienced operating 
in a paramilitary role during AIM’s seventy-two day occupation of 
Wounded Knee. It concludes with a recommendation that if another such 
incident were to occur, the FBI should be given command and control.76 
In May 1976, the FBI began leaking teletypes on supposed AIM “Dog 
Soldiers” to the media, just before the trial of Bob Robideau and Dino 
Butler took place.77 The teletypes alleged AIM had recruited a force of two 
                                                                                                                 
“[e]xtralegal [f]orce,” by using breaks-ins, threats, and beatings to frighten and subdue 
members of targeted groups. Id. at 10. 
 69. Id. at 22. 
 70. Report from FBI Denver Field Office (Jan. 12, 1973), in CHURCHILL & VANDER 
WALL, supra note 55, at 235-36.  
 71. Teletype from Acting Director, FBI to Special Agent in Charge, Albany (May 4, 
1973), in CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, supra note 55, at 260. 
 72. Id. at 261. 
 73. Memorandum from FBI Albuquerque Field Office (Oct. 31, 1973), in CHURCHILL & 
VANDER WALL, supra note 55, at 246. 
 74. Memorandum from J. E. O’Connell to Mr. Gebhardt (Apr. 24, 1975), in CHURCHILL 
& VANDER WALL, supra note 55, at 250. 
 75. Background Paper on the American Indian and the Takeover of Wounded Knee by 
the American Indian Movement (Apr. 24, 1975), in CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, supra 
note 55, at 251. 
 76. Id. at 253-54. 
 77. CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, supra note 55, at 274. 
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thousand guerillas trained to begin undertaking acts of terrorism.78 One 
teletype claimed that the group, training in the Northwest, was to travel to 
the Yankton Sioux Reservation in June to attend a traditional dance, which 
was a cover for their plan to disrupt Second Biennial International Treaty 
Conference.79 Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall summed up the FBI’s 
intent for the teletype: 
Although Butler-Robideau defense attorney William Kunstler 
put FBI Director Clarence Kelley on the stand and forced him to 
admit the Bureau had “not one shred” of evidence to support 
these allegations, the disinformation continued to generate 
headlines through the remainder of the trial. . . . [T]his was by 
conscious design of the FBI rather than through the story’s 
having simply acquired “a life of its own.”80  
AIM was first listed in the FBI’s Domestic Terrorist Digest on June 18, 
1976,81 just a month before the acquittal of Robideau and Butler, and barely 
three months before the Senate subcommittee hearing that involved the 
statements of Doug Durham. The entry on AIM described two planned 
incidents: disruption of various celebrations of the nation’s Bicentennial on 
July 4, 1976, reportedly based on an AIM members’ statements that AIM 
planned to “‘blow out the candles’ on America’s birthday cake;”82 and a 
separate event culminating in an Indian caravan reaching the Little Big 
Horn River on June 26, 1976 in recognition of the 100th anniversary of 
Custer’s defeat.83 The entry also mentioned a shoot-out in November 1975 
between Oregon state police and Indian militants who were in possession of 
“a large amount of explosives and weapons.”84  
In summary, it is clear from its actions that the FBI considered AIM a 
radical and pernicious element in American society that required it to 
investigate and bring charges against members whenever the opportunity 
arose. To highlight the significance of these actions, it is important to 
contrast the FBI’s mission with the reality. The FBI characterizes itself as  
                                                                                                                 
 78. Id. at 276. 
 79. Second “Dog Soldier” Teletype (June 22, 1976), in CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, 
supra note 55, at 278. 
 80. CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, supra note 55, at 276 (citations omitted). 
 81. Id. at 274. 
 82. Bicentennial Overview, DOMESTIC TERRORIST DIGEST, June 18, 1976 (vol. 7, no. 3), 
reprinted in CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, supra note 55, at 275-76. 
 83. American Indian Movement (AIM), DOMESTIC TERRORIST DIGEST, June 18, 1976 
(vol. 7, no. 3), reprinted in CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, supra note 55, at 276. 
 84. Id. 
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an intelligence-driven and a threat-focused national security 
organization . . . the mission of. . . [which] is to protect and 
defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence 
threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United 
States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice services to 
federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and 
partners.85 
In his autobiography, former FBI Director Louis Freeh articulated the core 
values of the Bureau as 
rigorous obedience to the Constitution of the United States; 
respect for the dignity of all those we protect; compassion; 
fairness; and uncompromising personal and institutional integrity 
. . . . Respect for the dignity of all whom we protect reminds us 
to wield law enforcement powers with restraint and to recognize 
the natural human tendency to be corrupted by power and to 
become callous in its exercise. Fairness and compassion ensure 
that we treat everyone with the highest regard for constitutional, 
civil, and human rights.86  
 In contrast, former agent M. Wesley Swearingen was more pessimistic 
about the honor and dignity of the Bureau, particularly with regard to its 
COINTELPRO operations: 
Very few citizens know the extent to which the FBI has gone to 
control our society. The FBI thinks it knows what is best for the 
country . . . . [COINTELPRO] is a threat to our freedom when a 
police agency in a democracy takes it upon itself to be judge and 
jury and to decide who should be fired from a job or what 
newspaper should go out of business . . . . It is a sad state of 
affairs when the FBI, instead of fighting crime, has to investigate 
activists, lawyers, and professors.87 
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Finally, Churchill and Vander Wall have characterized the FBI in stridently 
critical terms:  
[N]ot as the country’s foremost crime-fighting agency – an 
image it has always actively promoted in collaboration with a 
vast array of “friendly” media representatives and “scholars” – 
but as America’s political police engaged in all manner of 
extralegality and illegality as expedients to containing and 
controlling political diversity within the United States.88  
But why would the FBI choose to monitor and investigate AIM, 
especially given the marginal status occupied by Indians for well over a 
century prior to AIM’s inception? One explanation involves the U.S. 
government’s determination to access the great mineral wealth beneath 
Indian reservations. As Peter Mattheissen explained, in 1974, 
[T]here was little if any documentation for the suspicion that the 
great wealth in minerals beneath reservation lands explained the 
government’s remorseless attitude toward militant Indians. Not 
that a prudent bureaucrat would put such a crass policy in 
writing; even so, a stronger case could have been made for 
organized suppression of the Indians’ long hope of sovereignty 
based on the treaty claims, and the vast complications for the 
government that that entailed. More likely, the government 
attitude, reflecting the needs of the great multinational 
corporations, was an outgrowth of both of these considerations; 
whatever its origins, the repression was carried out.89 
Jim Messerschmidt explained the government’s conduct relating to the 
murders of agents Coler and Williams similarly. He noted that one-third of 
low-sulphur strippable coal and eighty percent of uranium in the United 
States were located on Indian lands at the time of the Pine Ridge 
Reservation murders.90 Yet in 1974, “less than [one-percent] of the uranium 
leases. . . made to oil companies. . . were producing energy”; the same was 
true of thirty-six percent of coal leases.91 In other words, there were vast 
reserves of energy on Indian lands not being utilized.  
Two other considerations also lend support to the theory that the U.S. 
government had its sights on Indian mineral resources. For one, it is 
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important to remember other events that were occurring during this time 
period. For example, in 1974, the United States experienced the first OPEC 
oil embargo, thus exposing the public to how vulnerable the country might 
be with regard to energy resources. Additionally, treaties hindered the U.S. 
government and corporations from accessing natural resources in Indian 
Country; thus, breaking treaties became a necessity if such resources were 
to be profitably accessed and extracted. Interestingly, the repeated violation 
of Indian treaties by the U.S. government was the primary reason Peltier 
joined AIM. He stated, 
Treaty issues have always been a major concern for Indian 
people. In every political campaign I can remember, honoring 
treaties was a focal point. The treaties would have provided for 
economic growth, adequate health care, education, and our own 
law enforcement and judicial systems, everything needed for a 
sovereign government to survive. Most important to us was that 
the United States government gave its word to Indian people and 
violated it, which in our culture is a dishonor. We had depended 
on the government's word only to be betrayed time after time.92 
The FBI’s intensive effort to neutralize AIM was not an anomaly, but  
indicative of the way the agency investigated and sought to crush 
sociopolitical movements it deemed subversive or radical. Other 
movements during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s that felt the sting of the 
FBI’s counterintelligence program included the Black Panthers, the 
Coalition for a New South, the Students for a Democratic Society, the 
National Organization for Women, the Weather Underground, and the New 
Left, just to name a few.93 During its history, COINTELPRO opened no 
less than two-thousand investigations, some of which were sparked by 
nothing more than a letter to a newspaper protesting censorship.94 This 
antagonism toward racial and ethnic minorities was present at the FBI’s 
creation in 1908, a time when Jim Crow laws and segregation were 
acceptable societal forces.95  
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Seen in this context, it should hardly be surprising that the FBI’s 
response to AIM was swift, aggressive, and focused. One of the most 
effective strategies the FBI employed in crushing “radical” movements was 
to target key individuals within the movement and find ways to arrest and 
imprison them. Early in the history of AIM, before the Wounded Knee 
protest, Leonard Peltier came to the FBI’s attention as someone who needed 
to be taken out of circulation. 
B. Leonard Peltier and the FBI 
Leonard Peltier had come under the watch of the FBI by February 1975 
in connection with a charge of attempted murder of an off-duty police 
officer in Milwaukee.96 Peltier failed to appear for trial on July 30, 1974, 
and the charge was still outstanding a year later.97 The FBI issued a 
“Wanted” poster in connection with the charge, which describes Peltier as 
“armed and extremely dangerous.”98 
In the investigation of the Pine Ridge Reservation murders, a teletype 
sent from the FBI Director claimed Peltier had been identified “running 
from Jumping Bull residence” on the day of the murders.99 Another FBI 
teletype on developing investigative strategy included the language “lock 
Peltier and Black Horse [sic] into this case.”100  
In July 1976, an urgent teletype was sent to the FBI Director from the 
Rapid City office analyzing what went wrong in the Robideau-Butler 
trial.101 It noted that no gag rule was imposed; as a result, the defense could 
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speak freely with the media, and the jury was not sequestered.102 Reference 
was also made to a lack of physical evidence linking the defendants to the 
crime scene, since the casings fired from the agents’ handguns were not 
allowed into evidence even though they were found in the cabin where 
Butler was arrested.103 Finally, the teletype cited a post-trial article from 
The Cedar Rapids Gazette, in which the jury foreman was interviewed and 
stated that one of the most crucial elements in the trial was that “an 
atmosphere of fear and violence existed on the reservation and that the 
defendants arguably could have been shooting in self-defense.”104  
A month later, a memo bearing the subject heading “RESMURS – 
CONTEMPLATED DISMISSAL OF PROSECUTION OF JAMES 
THEODORE EAGLE; CONTINUING PROSECUTION OF LEONARD 
PELTIER” detailed a decision to drop charges against Jimmy Eagle “so that 
the full prosecutive weight of the Federal Government could be directed 
against Leonard Peltier.”105  
The FBI had indicted four Indians for the deaths of agents Coler and 
Williams. Robideau and Butler had been acquitted, and it was increasingly 
obvious to the FBI that Jimmy Eagle had not been present at the Jumping 
Bull Compound the day of the firefight. That left one last possibility for a 
conviction: Leonard Peltier. 
C. Extradition from Canada 
Peltier fled to Canada to seek political asylum; he was arrested there on 
February 6, 1976 and subsequently extradited.106 The extradition papers 
submitted to the Canadian government included affidavits by Myrtle Poor 
Bear claiming she was Peltier’s girlfriend, was with Peltier at the Jumping 
Bull Compound, and was a witness to the killings.107 In addition, she stated 
that Peltier admitted responsibility for the killings to her.108 
Myrtle Poor Bear provided the U.S. government with three affidavits 
dated February 19, February 23, and March 31, 1976. In the first affidavit, 
which was not included as part of the extradition package, she stated that 
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Peltier “gave orders on what was to be done.”109 During the second week of 
June 1975, Peltier and others began planning to kill various government 
officials.110 Poor Bear alleged Peltier knew agents were coming to the 
Jumping Bull compound the day before agents Coler and Williams arrived, 
that he told people to prepare to kill them, and that he instructed Poor Bear 
to get ready to escape.111 In this first affidavit, Poor Bear also claimed to 
have left the compound the night before the shootings and thus was not 
present at the firefight.112 
Four days later, her story changed rather dramatically. In the February 23 
affidavit, Poor Bear claimed she was at the firefight: “I was present the day 
the Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were killed. I saw 
Leonard Peltier shoot the FBI agents.”113  
The March 31 affidavit told a more detailed and incriminating version of 
the killings. Here, Poor Bear alleged she saw an agent with a handgun 
confront Peltier, who was holding a rifle.114 Poor Bear said that when the 
agent surrendered, she attempted to flee but was restrained by another 
person.115 She then heard a gunshot, saw Peltier’s rifle jerk up, and saw the 
FBI agent’s body jump into the air and come face down on the ground.116 
She heard additional shots fired as she left the area.117 
During the extradition, Bill Halprin was the Department of Justice 
prosecutor acting on behalf of the United States.118 Halprin claimed he was 
unaware of the February 19 affidavit but would have submitted it as part of 
the extradition had he known of it.119  
During the appeal of his conviction, Peltier claimed that the United 
States had violated the Webster-Ashburton Treaty in the matter of his 
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extradition.120 Signed by the United States and Great Britain in 1842, the 
critical text of the treaty is found in Article X, which reads, 
It is agreed that the United States and Her Britannic Majesty 
shall, upon mutual requisitions by them, or their Ministers, 
Officers, or authorities, respectively made, deliver up to justice, 
all persons who, being charged with the crime of murder, or 
assault with intent to commit murder, or Piracy, or arson, or 
robbery, or Forgery, or the utterance of forged paper, committed 
within the jurisdiction of either, shall seek an asylum, or shall be 
found, within the territories of the other: Provided, that this shall 
only be done upon such evidence of criminality as, according to 
the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged, 
shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment 
for trial, if the crime or offense had there been committed.121 
D. Denial of Offer of Proof 
Peltier’s defense at trial offered Myrtle Poor Bear’s testimony “to 
demonstrate how the FBI intentionally and falsely constructed a case 
against Peltier by introducing certain pieces of evidence through particular 
witnesses, but that these pieces were flawed.”122 During her testimony, Poor 
Bear stated that she had never met Peltier, that she was not his girlfriend, 
and that she was not at the Jumping Bull compound the day of the 
firefight.123 Further, she claimed to have been very frightened of the FBI 
agents who interviewed her as they had threatened her with a fifteen-year 
prison sentence if she did not cooperate and repeatedly made references to 
Anna Mae Aquash, an Indian activist who had died under mysterious 
circumstances.124 She also claimed to have signed two of the affidavits 
without having read them.125 
Judge Paul Benson did not allow any of this testimony to be heard by the 
jury.126 Benson held that Poor Bear was under great stress, was not credible 
as a witness, and her testimony was likely to prejudice the prosecution.127 
The prosecutor, Lynn Crooks, agreed, stating that such testimony would 
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deflect attention from the case and make it appear that it was the 
government, and not Peltier, who was on trial.128  
E. Possible Coerced Testimony 
Two of the three young AIM members picked up by agents Coler and 
Williams the day before the firefight, Michael Anderson and Wilford 
Draper, along with a third AIM member, Norman Brown, testified as 
government witnesses during the Peltier trial.129 Under cross-examination, 
they all claimed to have been coerced into giving false testimony by the 
FBI.130 Although the government referred to each of the three as 
“eyewitnesses” to the murders, none of them testified that they actually saw 
Peltier shoot and kill Coler and Williams.131 
Anderson’s testimony during direct examination appeared to be self-
impeaching. He first stated that he had seen Leonard Peltier along the tree 
line shooting at the FBI agents.132 He also said he did not see anyone by the 
agents’ cars but then later claimed to have seen Peltier standing by them.133 
When he took a final look in the direction of the agents’ cars, he saw 
neither people nor vehicles.134 Anderson had been interviewed about the 
murders on September 11, 1975 by FBI Special Agents Gary Adams and O. 
Victor Harvey; during cross-examination Anderson claimed that Adams 
threatened to beat him if he did not produce answers the agents desired.135 
Wilford Draper testified on direct that he heard the shooting during the 
firefight but had gone and hidden in a ravine.136 FBI Special Agents Doyle 
and Stapleton interrogated Draper following an arrest for alcohol and 
robbery charges in January 1976.137 According to Draper’s testimony under 
cross-examination, the FBI warned him that if he failed to cooperate, he 
would be indicted for the murders of agents Coler and Williams.138 He was 
also promised a new identity, job training, a job, and financial security if he 
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cooperated, as well as having the pending criminal charges against him 
dropped.139 
Norman Brown was brought to Sioux Falls, South Dakota in January 
1976 to testify in front of a grand jury. Brown claimed to have seen Peltier, 
Bob Robideau, and Dino Butler near the agents’ cars;140 however, he 
recanted this testimony during the Peltier trial.141 When cross-examined, he 
alleged that he made the statements to the grand jury because he thought 
that was what the government wanted him to say.142 
F. Firearms and Toolmark Identification 
1. The Evidence in the Peltier Case 
Because the FBI considered a single .223 cartridge found in the trunk of 
Agent Coler’s car to be an  inculpatory piece of evidence against Peltier,143 
the controversy surrounding the firearms and toolmark identification is 
central to understanding the conviction and subsequent denial of Peltier’s 
appeals.  
The AR-15 rifle that Peltier used during the firefight was recovered from 
a car that exploded on a turnpike near Wichita, Kansas on September 10, 
1975.144 The vehicle was carrying Michael Anderson, Bob Robideau, 
Norman Charles, and three others. The car also contained a variety of 
weapons and explosives.145 The firing pin of the AR-15 was badly damaged 
in the explosion, impairing the ability of Special Agent Evan Hodge, the 
ballistics specialist on the case, to perform analysis on it.146 Two other 
weapons and the .223 shell casings were given to Hodge to analyze.147 
At Peltier’s trial, the government produced a ballistics report from Hodge 
in which he could not connect any of the weapons he analyzed with the 
firefight at Pine Ridge.148 While under oath, Hodge confirmed that he had 
written the report and stood by his findings.149 However, Hodge maintained 
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he had not yet looked at all of the .223 casings at the time of the report, 
particularly the casing found in the trunk of Agent Coler’s car.150  
In February 1976, Hodge signed an affidavit while under oath claiming 
that he could connect the .223 casing in question with the AR-15 rifle 
extracted from the vehicle explosion.151  Because the AR-15 could not be 
fired, Hodge removed the bolt from it and placed it in another AR-15 and 
test-fired it.152 At trial, he explained to the jury that a firing test with the 
original firing pin was not possible because of how badly it was 
damaged.153 
Several inconsistent facts regarding Hodge’s testimony emerged once 
Peltier’s lawyers were able to obtain FBI correspondence.154 One of the 
documents revealed that the .223 casing in question had arrived for Hodge 
to analyze sometime in July 1975, but he did not analyze it until December 
or January.155 A September 27, 1975 teletype from the Rapid City FBI 
office to Washington specifically requested that the AR-15 from the 
exploded vehicle be matched against the casings found at the firefight, 
particularly the one found in the trunk of Coler’s car.156 Five days later, the 
October 2 report from Hodge was sent via teletype to the Rapid City office, 
in which the comparisons between the casings and the AR-15 proved 
negative.157 Given the interest of the Rapid City office in the specific .223 
casing from the trunk of Agent Coler’s car, Hodge’s claim that he received 
no priority instructions contradicts good law enforcement policy for 
gathering evidence discussed above, particularly for a case of this 
magnitude. 
The inconsistencies in protocol, prioritization, and analysis tend to 
discredit the firearms and toolmark identification evidence. In addition to 
the specifics of the Peltier case, there are unresolved fundamental issues 
regarding the use of firearms and toolmark identification in criminal trials 
in general. These concerns are highlighted in the following section. 
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2. Firearms and Toolmark Identification: “Science” Without Foundation  
The strongest evidence proffered by the government in its case against 
Peltier was the firearms and toolmark identification, the so-called ballistics 
evidence. However, this type of forensic analysis has recently been shown 
to lack reliability and a firm scientific foundation, and thus is increasingly 
being restricted in courtrooms.  
Professor Adina Schwartz succinctly described the practice:  “The 
premise underlying firearms and toolmark identification is that a tool, such 
as a firearm barrel, leaves a unique toolmark on an object, such as a bullet. 
An equally crucial premise is that toolmarks are reproducible.”158 Professor 
Schwartz identified three ways in which toolmarks may be misidentified: 
(1) the individual characteristics of toolmarks are comprised of 
non-unique marks, (2) subclass characteristics shared by more 
than one tool may be confused with individual characteristics 
unique to one and only one tool, and (3) the individual 
characteristics of the marks made by a particular tool change 
over time.159 
The first misidentification problem is analogous to the nuances of 
fingerprint and DNA analysis.160 As Professor Schwartz explained, 
As a result of the overlapping individual characteristics of 
toolmarks made by different tools, examiners who assume that a 
certain amount of resemblance proves that the same tool 
produced both test and evidence toolmarks may be wrong 
because the same amount of resemblance may exist in toolmarks 
produced by different tools of that type.161 
The second and third misidentifications are far more problematic.162 
With regard to the second, manufacturing processes tend to create tools and 
firearms with a uniform design, so that they have the same “subclass 
characteristics” and therefore lack the unique nature of fingerprints or DNA 
analysis.163 The third concern relates to the changes in the firearm over time 
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and how this can affect toolmarks.164 Unlike an individual’s DNA, which 
remains constant throughout the lifetime, toolmarks change with the 
weapon’s use and age.165 
Professor Schwartz states that examiners often ignore the second and 
third misidentifications: “[I]nstead, they fundamentally mislead judges and 
juries (and perhaps themselves) by claiming to be able to single out a 
particular firearm or other tool as the source of an evidence toolmark, to the 
exclusion of all other tools in the world.”166 She also noted that examiners 
use these same claims to evade the question of whether a randomly selected 
tool would make as convincing a toolmark as the suspect tool.167  
In a 2009 report, the National Research Council expressed deep concern 
over the reliability of firearms and toolmark identification.168 The report 
noted, for example, that a good deal of forensic evidence “is introduced in 
criminal trials without any meaningful scientific validation, determination 
of error rates, or reliability testing to explain the limits of the discipline.”169 
Further, the report drew important attention to the lack of information 
regarding variability in firearm manufacturing such that there is no clear 
baseline for determining how points of similarity constitute a significant 
amount.170 In addition, the methods used to determine variation lack 
sufficient study and review to be considered scientifically reliable.171 
Even before the National Research Council report was made public, 
some courts were skeptical of the reliability of firearms and toolmark 
identification. For example, United States v. Green,172 decided in 2005, was 
one of the first cases to advocate for a more careful review of the 
admissibility of toolmark evidence in criminal trials. The district court held 
that experts “could only describe the ways in which casings were similar 
but not that the casings came from a specific weapon ‘to the exclusion of 
every other firearm in the world.’”173 This is distinct from the FBI’s 
presentation of the firearms and toolmark identification in the Peltier case, 
                                                                                                                 
 164. Id. at 26. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 32 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 167. Id. at 31-32. 
 168. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A PATH FORWARD 107-08 (Aug. 2009). 
 169. Id.  
 170. Id. at 154. 
 171. Id.  
 172. 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005).  
 173. Paul C. Giannelli, Ballistics Evidence Under Fire, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2011, at 50, 
50 (emphasis added) (quoting Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 107). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
58 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
 
 
where the bullets that killed agents Coler and Williams were presented as 
fired from the AR-15 later damaged in the vehicle explosion–-and from that 
weapon alone. 
The case of United States v. Glynn174 closely followed the analysis of the 
National Research Council. The court stated that 
[f]irearm and toolmark analysis rests on the twin assumptions 
that the surface contours of every gun are unique and that, every 
time that gun is fired, some of those unique markings, along with 
markings caused by the act of firing itself, are transferred to the 
shell casing and bullet, leaving distinctive patterns on each of 
them.175 
Noting how firearms are mass-produced in the modern era and produced 
with a high degree of precision, the court found the distinctiveness of an 
individual weapon clearly diminished as compared to earlier times when 
firearms were predominately manufactured by hand.176 
In United States v. Taylor,177 the court restricted the firearms examiner’s 
testimony. Specifically, the examiner could not state that his methods 
allowed him to reach his “conclusion as a matter of scientific certainty.”178 
Further, the examiner was not permitted to state that the analysis produced 
a match to the exclusion of every other firearm.179 
Courtroom trends in light of the low probability that a firearms expert 
can determine with any degree of certainty that a bullet was fired from a 
specific weapon should be taken into account in recognizing the lack of 
evidence against Peltier.  
G. Vehicle Discrepancy 
According to testimony, agents Coler and Williams communicated by 
radio that they were following a red and white van into the Jumping Bull 
Compound.180 After the firefight, Special Agent Gary Adams, the first to 
arrive at the scene, radioed in that he saw a red pickup about to leave the 
compound.181 FBI stenographer Ann Johnson recorded the radio message, 
                                                                                                                 
 174. 578 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 175. Id. at 572. 
 176. Id. 
 177. 663 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D.N.M. 2009). 
 178. Id. at 1180. 
 179. Id. 
 180. MESSERSCHMIDT, supra note 1, at 49. 
 181. Id. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol38/iss1/2
No. 1] THE LEONARD PELTIER CASE 59 
 
 
and, when interviewed two days later, stated that she alone recorded the 
transmissions that were coming from Adams and others.182 Sometime later, 
the FBI claimed that Special Agent George O’Klock came to assist Johnson 
in interpreting the transmissions.183 When testifying at the Robideau-Butler 
trial, Adams admitted that he had described a red pickup when sending the 
radio message; however, during the Peltier trial, he denied ever making 
such a transmission.184 The inconsistencies in vehicle description are 
indicative of “the kinds of problems the FBI testimony presented 
throughout the [Peltier] trial.185 
H. Pathology Reports and Testimony at Trial 
The FBI had Dr. Robert D. Bloemendaal perform an autopsy on agents 
Coler and Williams.186 In a summary report dated June 27, 1975, Dr. 
Bloemendaal stated that the agents had been shot a total of three times 
(Williams once, Coler twice) from a distance of no more than ten feet.187 
Williams was struck in the hand first; then, the bullet penetrated his skull, 
killing him.188 Coler was shot both in the head and chin, both having the 
potential of being “immediately fatal”.189  
In addition, Bloemendaal’s autopsy concluded that Williams had been 
shot first and died instantly.190 This troubled the FBI, because Williams had 
supposedly radioed, “I’m hit,” to other agents during the firefight.191 A 
memo was immediately sent to FBI headquarters discussing the need to 
clear up the confusion created by the autopsy report before the FBI made 
any public statements.192 The FBI then enlisted the services of Dr. Thomas 
Noguchi, who conducted expensive forensic tests with the objective of 
negating Bloemendaal’s findings.193 
Trial testimony shed little light on the murders. Bloemendaal testified, 
per the FBI’s theory, that it was the last shot that proved fatal to 
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Williams.194 Additionally, the government, over vigorous objections by the 
defense, was permitted to introduce gory autopsy photographs of the two 
agents.195 
I.The United States Civil Rights Commission’s Reports 
As a corollary to the above discussion, the United States Civil Rights 
Commission produced two reports regarding the conduct of the FBI on the 
Pine Ridge Reservation post-firefight.   
The first, dated July 9, 1975, described a state of fear on the Pine Ridge 
Reservation: Indians had their homes searched without warrants, they 
received threats from investigating FBI agents, and they were kept in the 
dark about the murders of agents Coler and Williams by the FBI.196 The 
report concludes by stating that the director of the Civil Rights Commission 
had requested that the U.S. Attorney General investigate the “allegedly 
improper” behavior of the FBI on the Pine Ridge Reservation since the time 
of the murders of agents Coler and Williams.197 
The second report, dated March 31, 1976, focused specifically on other 
violent incidents on the Pine Ridge Reservation. The first incident began 
when shots were fired at the house of Gus Dull Knife.198 Despite 
eyewitnesses pointing out shooters to BIA police, no one was arrested.199 
Sporadic shooting continued for two days with no law enforcement 
intervention.200  The second incident involved the discovery of the body of 
Anna Mae Aquash and allegations that the FBI was involved in a cover-up 
of her true cause of death.201  
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IV. Post-Trial: The Appeals History 
Peltier’s appeals history is long and complex, with a variety of motions 
that included vacating judgment, disqualification of the trial judge, request 
for a new trial, sentence reduction, and parole issues.  
His chances for success at the appellate level were undoubtedly hindered 
by his escape from Lompoc Federal Prison in California on July 20, 
1979.202 He was captured six days later in possession of a weapon.203 Peltier 
claimed he escaped after uncovering a plot to murder him in the prison.204 
One of the men who left with Peltier was shot in the back and killed during 
the escape.205 
The following narrative presents the appeals and motions in 
chronological order, relying almost exclusively on the various court 
opinions. 
A. The 1978 Appeals of the Murder Conviction 
After his conviction, Peltier appealed the district court’s ruling to the 
Eighth Circuit.206 The appeal was submitted on April 12, 1978 and decided 
on September 14, 1978, with the Eighth Circuit affirming the trial court’s 
verdict. The Eighth Circuit began its analysis by acknowledging that “the 
evidence against Peltier was primarily circumstantial.”207 The court then 
cited eight elements of the case that provide “the strongest evidence that 
Peltier committed or aided and abetted the murders.”208 The first piece of 
evidence listed was that Peltier was riding in the “van” the agents followed 
into the Jumping Bull compound.209 Second, Peltier knew he was being 
followed by the FBI, and also he had reason believe they were looking for 
him that morning.210 Fourth was testimony from Michael Anderson that he 
saw Peltier with an AR-15 rifle that morning.211 Fifth, the agents were 
killed with a “high velocity, small caliber weapon,” and Peltier’s weapon 
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was the “highest velocity weapon fired that day.”212 Sixth, the bullets found 
at the scene were linked to the AR-15.213 Seventh, Wilford Draper testified 
he overheard Peltier discussing the murders the evening of June 26.214 
Finally, several months later, Peltier fled the scene after being stopped by 
police in Oregon, and the motor home in which he was traveling contained 
Agent Coler’s revolver in a paper bag bearing Peltier’s thumbprint.215 
Peltier’s appeal had five elements: (1) certain trial evidence was 
“prejudicial and inflammatory”; (2) the trial judge “refused to instruct the 
jury” that he had been framed by the FBI, and he was denied introducing 
much of the FBI misconduct at trial; (3) the trial court abused its discretion 
by refusing “to reread testimony requested by the jury”; (4) because the 
government violated the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, “the trial court had no 
jurisdiction to try him”; and (5) the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
effectively barred prosecution.216 
For the first element, Peltier argued the trial court’s decision to admit 
evidence of prior criminal charges was particularly “prejudicial and 
inflammatory.”217 The trial court allowed in evidence of an earlier charge 
(later dropped) brought against Peltier in Wisconsin for attempted murder 
of an off-duty police officer, as well as evidence of flight in Oregon and the 
materials found in the motor home.218 The trial court also admitted evidence 
of an alleged robbery of a ranch house in which Peltier took a .3030 rifle 
and pick-up truck as he fled to Canada.219 Finally, the court admitted 
weapons evidence, including Agents Williams’ revolver, found three 
months later on the Rosebud Indian Reservation, even though Peltier was 
nowhere near there at the time.220 The Eighth Circuit stated, ”Ordinarily the 
admission into evidence of weapons, or picture of weapons, which are not 
directly related to the crime, and to which proper objection is made, is 
prejudicial to the defendant and in many cases it has been held to be 
reversible error.”221 However, the court noted that virtually no objection 
had been raised by Peltier’s counsel regarding the admissibility of such 
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evidence.222 The court also held, “[T]he direct and circumstantial evidence 
of Peltier’s guilt was strong and, in our opinion, the admission of these 
additional exhibits did not prejudice the defendant’s chances for 
acquittal.”223  The Eighth Circuit had acknowledged earlier in its opinion 
that the evidence against Peltier was largely circumstantial and did not 
explain or describe the nature of the direct evidence against him nor why 
evidence of Peltier’s guilt was strong.224 
The court also dismissed Peltier’s assertion of an FBI frame-up, stating 
that the trial judge instructed the jury properly about three witnesses: 
Anderson, Draper, and Brown, who confessed during cross-examination 
that they had lied before the grand jury because they had been threatened by 
the FBI, but swore under oath that their testimonies at trial were the truth.225  
The appellate court found that the trial court’s instructions about credible 
witnesses was detailed and made clear to the jury that the defense was 
asserting a theory of government frame-up.226 
Peltier argued that he was unable to introduce evidence of FBI 
misconduct, mainly because the trial court excluded the testimony of 
Myrtle Poor Bear and Jimmy Eagle.227 The court countered his argument: 
“It is only where the trial court excludes relevant evidence without 
sufficient justification that the defendant’s constitutional right to 
compulsory process is violated.”228 The trial court weighed four factors in 
determining whether to allow such evidence into the trial: (1) Peltier’s 
failure to show that any of this evidence was used against him; (2) lack of 
probative value of the evidence; (3) the probability that the government 
would respond by offering countervailing evidence, lengthening the trial; 
and (4) that the evidence might divert the jury’s attention from Peltier’s 
guilt or innocence and prejudice the government.229 The Eighth Circuit, 
without conducting analysis, merely concluded, 
While the more prudent course might have been to allow the 
defense to present the evidence, we find no abuse of discretion in 
the trial court’s exclusion of the testimony of Jimmy Eagle and 
Myrtle Poor Bear, in light of its low probative value, the 
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potential for further delay in the trial, and the danger of unfair 
prejudice to the government.230 
The last three elements of Peltier’s appeal were also disposed of by the 
Eighth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit found that it was well within the trial 
judge’s discretion to grant or deny jury requests to read certain trial 
testimony.231 As for the treaty violation related to Peltier’s extradition, the 
court stated it was “clear from a review of the trial transcript”232 that the 
testimony of Myrtle Poor Bear was not the only evidence used in the 
extradition, and agreed with the government’s argument that the 
“jurisdiction of the trial court over the defendant is not affected by the 
manner in which his presence before the court was obtained.”233 As for the 
collateral estoppel claim, the court held that since Peltier was not a party to 
the acquittal trial of Robideau and Butler, he could not invoke the 
doctrine.234 
At oral arguments of the appeal, Judge Ross questioned Evan Hultman, 
one of the government prosecutors, about the affidavits of Myrtle Poor Bear 
and the coercion used by the FBI to obtain her signatures on them.235 
Hultman was extremely evasive to the judge’s pointed questions, but agreed 
that given the contradictions in the affidavits, he was convinced that Poor 
Bear was not credible as a witness.236 Judge Ross pressed him on the issue, 
stating that if the government was willing to fabricate evidence for purposes 
of extradition, would they not also be likely to fabricate evidence at trial.237 
Hultman had no choice but to offer his full agreement.238 
B. Subsequent Motions and Appeals 
1. California 
After Peltier was apprehended following his prison escape, he was tried 
in federal district court in California and convicted.239 He moved to have 
the trial judge recused because of discriminatory statements the judge 
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allegedly made against American Indians.240 The federal district court judge 
reviewing the motion stated it was not filed in a timely manner nor was it 
legally sufficient, and dismissed it.241 
Peltier then appealed his conviction of escaping from prison and being a 
felon in possession of a firearm to the Ninth Circuit.242 He argued that he 
had been denied the opportunity to cross-examine a government witness 
and that his theory of defense--that he was going to be murdered in prison--
was improperly restricted.243 In a per curiam opinion, the Ninth Circuit 
upheld the district court’s ruling, stating it had examined the evidence of 
Peltier’s claim that he was about to be murdered, but that “it [did] not 
measure up to probable cause to believe that any evidence exists that would 
justify an armed jail break pursuant to the defendant’s theory.”244  
2. Motions to Disqualify Judge and Vacate Judgment 
Later in 1982, Peltier filed a motion in the District Court of the 
Southeastern Division of North Dakota to vacate the judgment of his 
conviction and to disqualify the trial judge, Paul Benson.245 By this time 
William Kunstler was working as counsel for Peltier.246 Judge Benson, 
writing a memorandum and order for the district court, stated that the “mere 
filing of a motion” was insufficient to have a presiding judge 
disqualified.247 Further, he stated that the motion to disqualify came a day 
before a determination on the motion to vacate judgment; the motion was 
not timely and no explanation was offered for the delay.248 The 
disqualification motion failed because it 
contends without specificity as to time, place or manner that the 
judge of this court participated in ex parte communications with 
members of the Department of Justice, the prosecution staff, and 
the F.B.I. The inference appears to have been drawn largely from 
events that took place before the judge of this court had any 
connection with the case . . . .249 
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Since no facts to support such claims were included in the motion for 
disqualification, Judge Benson dismissed the motion.250 
In a separate opinion, Judge Benson dealt with the motion to vacate the 
judgment.251 Peltier relied on Brady v. Maryland252 to argue the illegality of 
the government’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.253 The district 
court dismissed the motion on essentially three grounds. First, Peltier failed 
to establish that the prosecutor had introduced perjured testimony at trial 
and that this was testimony the prosecutor knew or should have known was 
perjured.254 Second, much of the argument in the motion dealt with 
nondisclosure by the government of exculpatory evidence.255 Peltier cited 
six violations of nondisclosure, including “a memorandum indicating that 
tests matching the .223 shell casing found in the trunk of Agent Coler’s car 
with Peltier’s AR-15 rifle were conducted with negative results, and 
documents indicating that it is highly unlikely that the government’s 
ballistics experts failed to study the .223 casing for several months.”256 
Peltier also alleged Brady violations for failing to disclose these items: FBI 
reports and other documents demonstrating that more than one vehicle was 
present during the firefight; documents showing that it would have been 
nearly impossible for an agent to have identified Peltier at the firefight 
scene through a high-powered rifle scope; FBI reports and memos 
indicating conflicting evidence about the pathology results; evidence 
gathered by the FBI implicating several people who were never charged; 
and “documents suggesting that persons other than those identified to the 
jury were present” at the firefight.257 
The court stated that the materiality of the evidence relating to guilt or 
innocence guided the legal analysis. Judge Benson rejected Peltier’s claim 
that Special Agent Evan Hodge’s testimony relating to firearms and 
toolmark identification amounted to perjury because Hodge was neither 
inconsistent nor misleading.258 According to the court, a reasonable juror 
could conclude that the .223 casings discussed in the October ballistics 
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reports did not include the casing found in the trunk of Agent Coler’s car 
(i.e. the casing allegedly fired from Peltier’s AR-15).259 
The court further dismissed any claims of perjury relating to the evidence 
of other vehicles, citing that a number of contradictory statements had been 
made at trial and the jury was aware of the general inconsistencies that 
existed regarding this issue.260 As for Peltier being identified through use of 
a high-powered rifle scope, the court asserted that even though there were 
failures to duplicate, the sighting does not amount to perjury; Judge Benson 
emphasized that the jury was aware of the witnesses’ inconsistent 
testimonies.261 
The court, citing United States v. Agurs,262 stated that the materiality of 
evidence is determined by whether admission of such evidence could affect 
the outcome of the trial.263 Furthermore, requests for disclosure of evidence 
must be specific.264 Specificity includes a number of factors, such as “the 
literal language of the defense request itself, the apparent exculpatory 
character of the evidence sought, and the reasonableness of the explanation 
for the prosecution not exposing the evidence or not considering it to be 
material.”265 
 The court decided that the defense’s very specific requests for disclosure 
of evidence on appeal indicated that its previous requests were of a general 
nature.266 In fact, the court stated, there were no general discovery motions 
filed by the defense because the defense counsel and the U.S. Attorney’s 
office reached a discovery agreement, which amounted to total 
disclosure.267 As such, this failed the test of materiality developed by the 
Supreme Court in Agurs.268 Furthermore, the court held that the evidence 
that Peltier wished to have introduced would not “create a reasonable doubt 
that did not otherwise exist.”269 
Peltier appealed the district court’s ruling on the motion to vacate 
judgment to the Eighth Circuit.270 The court reviewed the nondisclosures as 
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well as the allegedly exculpatory evidence and remanded the case for an 
evidentiary hearing; however, the court limited the lower court’s review to 
“any testimony or documentary evidence relevant to the meaning of the 
October 2, 1975, teletype and its relation to the ballistics evidence 
introduced at Peltier’s trial.”271 
3. Remand and Appeal of Motion to Vacate Judgment 
With the Eighth Circuit’s decision to remand, the history of Peltier’s 
appeals reached a critical point. For the first time, a court had ruled in favor 
of Peltier, albeit limiting the evidence for a evidentiary rehearing to the 
October 1975 FBI teletype concerning the firearms and toolmark 
identification. Nevertheless, this gave Peltier and his attorneys hope that the 
introduction of the firearms and toolmark identification teletype, which 
contradicted later reports that had been entered into evidence at trial, might 
prove to be the key to overturning the murder conviction and the award of a 
new trial. After all, the government had claimed that the firearms and 
toolmark identification, and in particular the one .223 shell casing found in 
the trunk of an FBI car, was, as discussed earlier, “perhaps the most 
important piece of evidence in this case. This little, small cartridge is 
ejected by the killers into the trunk of the car.”272 
The U.S. District Court of the Southeastern Division of North Dakota 
returned an opinion on May 22, 1985.273 The court echoed the concerns of 
the Eighth Circuit about the wording of the October 2 teletype--that the AR-
15 rifle received by the FBI contained a firing pin that was different from 
the one used at the murder scene.274 As the court stated, 
This language raises several possibilities not considered by the 
district court and not as readily explained away by the record as 
it presently exists. For example, the use of the word “different” 
could indicate that the FBI knew the firing pin in the damaged 
AR-15 had been changed after the June 26, 1975, murders. Such 
a discrepancy can be found nowhere else in the record, and could 
raise questions regarding the truth and accuracy of Hodge’s 
testimony regarding his inability to reach a “conclusion” on the 
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firing pin analysis and his positive conclusion regarding the 
extractor markings.275 
But the court was quick to add that in the absence of hard evidence, it was 
not possible to suggest that the teletype established improper FBI or 
government “motives or actions.”276 
The court devoted most of its opinion to a painstaking and confusing 
reconstruction of the sequence with which Special Agent Hodge analyzed 
the ballistic evidence. The key point appeared to be that Hodge had 
analyzed seven .223 casings (assigned Q numbers 100-105, and 130) 
against the AR-15 firing pin by the time of the October 2 teletype, and none 
of the casings were the one found in the trunk of the agent’s car.277 
According to the court, “Hodge never received a specific priority request to 
examine the .223 casing found in the trunk of Agent Coler’s car (Q # 2628). 
Therefore, it was examined in the ordinary course of his work.”278 Because 
the government claimed that this casing was the single most important 
piece of evidence at Peltier’s trial, it is curious that no such priority request 
was made for its analysis. 
The court concluded that the October 2 teletype did not “evince perjured 
testimony” because the .223 casing in question was not analyzed along with 
the firing pin of the AR-15.279 The word “different” used in the teletype 
simply meant “that the Wichita AR-15 could not be associated with any of 
the bullet casings that had been tested at that time based on firing pin 
comparisons.”280 Furthermore, not only would the introduction of the 
teletype have not affected the outcome of the trial, the teletype itself “can 
be considered preliminary information, which the prosecution had no 
obligation to disclose to the defendant.”281 
Peltier appealed the ruling. The Eighth Circuit, in what would be the 
closest Peltier would ever come to winning in court, affirmed, but in an 
evasive opinion that closed with a tepid speculation: 
In the light of the full record, the jury might have given 
additional weight to the fact that there was more than one AR-15 
on the compound on June 26 had the inconsistencies in the 
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ballistic evidence introduced at trial been supplemented with the 
reports and data discovered after trial. Moreover, under such 
circumstances it might have given more serious consideration to 
the possibility that an AR-15 other than the Wichita AR-15 was 
used in the murder of either Coler or Williams, but we cannot 
say that it is reasonably probable that it would have been 
sufficiently impressed by these possibilities to have reached a 
different result at trial. . . . There is a possibility that the jury 
would have acquitted Leonard Peltier had the records and data 
improperly withheld from the defense been available to him in 
order to better exploit and reinforce the inconsistencies casting 
strong doubts upon the government's case. Yet, we are bound by 
the Bagley test requiring that we be convinced, from a review of 
the entire record, that had the data and records withheld been 
made available, the jury probably would have reached a different 
result. We have not been so convinced.282 
The Bagley test derives from United States v. Bagley.283 Justice 
Blackmun wrote the majority opinion and reviewed Brady, among other 
cases, to determine that “evidence is material only if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different.”284 
4. Motions to Set Aside Convictions and Reduce Life Sentences 
By the early 1990s, Peltier had been moved to Leavenworth Federal 
Prison in Kansas. For the second time, Peltier brought a post-conviction 
proceeding to set aside his conviction. The district court denied relief, and 
he appealed to the Eighth Circuit.285 Peltier’s motion claimed that he was 
denied due process on four grounds: (1) that during the previous appeal, an 
alleged government admission changed the government’s theory of the case 
and destroyed the legal basis for his conviction; (2) the district court denied 
him the opportunity to present evidence of self-defense; (3) the government 
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engaged in improper conduct; and (4) “the government deliberately created 
an intimidating atmosphere at trial.”286 
The Eighth Circuit denied the first claim, stating that the government had 
originally tried the case on alternative theories.287 One was that Peltier shot 
the agents at the close range, killing both of them, and alternatively, even if 
he had not killed them, he “was equally guilty of murder as an aider and 
abettor.”288 The court pointed out that the indictment originally charged 
Peltier with violating three sections of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, including: 
murder, murder of an FBI member or employee, and aiding and abetting an 
offense against the United States.289 The court followed with testimony 
from the earlier conviction appeal,290 an exchange between Judge Heaney 
and Assistant United State Attorney Crooks, the principal prosecutor in the 
case. Peltier had seized on Crooks’ reply to the judge--that the government 
could not prove who shot the agents--as evidence that the only theory the 
government could have pursued was aiding and abetting.291 The court 
ultimately rejected the argument by stating that Crooks was “reiterating that 
the government did not present any direct evidence that Peltier shot the 
agents at pointblank range, since all of the government’s proof was 
circumstantial.”292 It is interesting that during the first appeal, the Eighth 
Circuit claimed that evidence against Peltier was both direct and 
circumstantial.293 
As for the remaining claims, the court stated that Peltier had failed to 
raise them in his first conviction appeal, and therefore introducing them 
now violated the Supreme Court’s reformulation of the “miscarriage of 
justice” test set forth in McCleskey v. Zant.294 The court further stated that 
Peltier had committed “an abuse of the proceedings” by failing to introduce 
the elements in the first appeal and bringing them forth in the second.295 His 
failure thus “justified the district court’s refusal to consider those issues in 
the present proceeding.”296 Finally, the court mentioned that amici had been 
filed for this proceeding by forty-nine members of the Canadian Parliament 
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that challenged Peltier’s extradition from Canada in 1976.297 The court 
dismissed such claims because it had already considered the issue and 
found no government misconduct; secondly, Peltier did not raise the issue 
in the current appeal.298 
In 2002, Peltier brought a renewed motion before the U.S. District Court 
for the District of North Dakota to have his life sentences reduced.299 The 
court held that Peltier had 120 days after denial of certiorari by the Supreme 
Court to file such a motion, and more than twenty years had passed.300 
Peltier claimed to have filed such a motion in a timely fashion, and 
therefore, his current motion related back to the original motion.301 The 
district court held that since the appeal had been considered and denied, no 
such relation back existed.302 The court also held the co-actors’ acquittal 
changed nothing about his trial and conviction because the trial judge knew 
of the earlier acquittal.303 Peltier appealed, and the Eighth Circuit, in a brief 
opinion, affirmed.304 
Peltier’s next effort was filing for habeas corpus relief, seeking either 
release or parole. The U.S. District Court of Kansas denied the petition in 
an unpublished opinion. In Peltier’s habeas petition he argued, 
(1) [the Parole Commission’s] decisions were arbitrary and 
capricious because it could not determine who shot the agents; 
(2) the decisions were based on incorrect information and 
discriminatory factors and thus were unlawful; (3) application of 
parole rules and regulations revised after his convictions violated 
ex post facto principles; and (4) failure to grant parole in light of 
his medical condition was arbitrary and capricious and amounted 
to cruel and unusual punishment.305 
It is necessary to review briefly Peltier’s parole hearing history, which is 
described in the Tenth Circuit’s opinion. He originally applied for parole in 
1986, but waived consideration and reapplied in August 1993.306 At that 
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time, the Parole Commission “calculated his parole guidelines at a 
minimum of 188 months” because of his first-degree murder conviction as 
well as several other convictions.307 At the time he had served 204 
months.308 Peltier made a statement at the parole hearing while represented 
by counsel.309 The Parole Commission denied parole and “set a fifteen-year 
reconsideration period due to the nature of the several crimes in which Mr. 
Peltier had been involved.”310 The Parole Commission referred its 
recommendation to the Regional Commissioner, who concurred, then 
passed it to the National Commissioners for review, and they also 
concurred.311 Peltier then appealed to the full Parole Commission, which 
recalculated his parole guidelines at a minimum of 200 months, and then 
concurred with the earlier recommendation.312 
Peltier was subsequently given a statutory interim hearing in 1995.313 
Although the hearing officer was persuaded that the evidence to support 
Peltier’s shooting of the agents was insufficient, he did not recommend any 
change to “Peltier’s parole status because he believed evidence that Mr. 
Peltier was a co-conspirator or aider and abettor in the agents’ executions 
justified his above-the-guidelines prison time.”314 A second hearing officer 
reviewed the case and recommended that the original Parole Commission 
recommendation be reinstated.315 Peltier appealed the interim hearing to the 
full Parole Commission, which acknowledged “the lack of direct evidence’ 
linking Peltier to the agents’ murders, but claimed that the circumstantial 
evidence of his involvement “met the preponderance of the evidence 
standard for the Commission’s findings.”316 
On August 20, 2009, the Parole Commission again denied Peltier parole 
and again stated that reconsideration would occur in fifteen years.317 The 
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Parole Commission also stated that he would be entitled to a statutory 
review every two years, beginning in July 2011.318 
In his motion to the Tenth Circuit, Peltier was contesting the fact that he 
had been denied parole and that the Parole Commission had delayed in 
reconsidering parole for fifteen years.319 He argued only the first of the four 
factors he had stated in his petition to the district court. In denying the 
petition, the court stated, “Much of the government’s behavior at the Pine 
Ridge Reservation and in its prosecution of Mr. Peltier is to be condemned. 
The government withheld evidence. It intimidated witnesses. These facts 
are not disputed.”320 After quoting from Peltier’s petition in which he 
argued government misconduct should be a critical factor in determining 
whether he should be immediately considered for parole, the court 
continues,  
He may be correct. But whether the Parole Commission gave 
proper weight to this mitigating evidence is not a question we 
have authority to review. Our only inquiry is whether the 
Commission was rational in concluding Mr. Peltier participated 
in the execution of two federal agents. On the record before us, 
we cannot say this determination was arbitrary and capricious.321 
Finally, the court stated that the Parole Commission’s principal finding was 
that Peltier shot and killed the two agents, and they found this to be rational. 
Therefore, there was no need to consider “the Commission’s implication 
that the same disposition is supportable if Mr. Peltier only aided and abetted 
at the murder scene.”322 
In 2005, Peltier moved to correct an illegal sentence. The U.S. District 
Court for the District of North Dakota denied the motion, and he appealed 
to the Eighth Circuit.323 Peltier contended that his sentence of two 
consecutive life terms was illegal, arguing the district court did not have 
jurisdiction because the two FBI agents were killed in Indian Country. In 
particular, Peltier was challenging the fact that he was convicted under 18 
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U.S.C. § 1114,324 “because § 1114, as applied to murders occurring on 
reservations, is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the 
commerce clause.”325 The court was unsympathetic, stating that Peltier’s 
claim was not appropriate under the relevant Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, and that § 1114 “criminalizes the killing of federal officers 
engaged in the performance of their official duties.”326 
In 2001, Peltier requested all documents pertaining to himself from the 
FBI.327 Frustrated by a lack of response, Peltier filed an action against the 
FBI in 2002 and received 70,419 pages of material.328 But the FBI withheld 
another 10,557 “on the ground that these records were exempt from 
disclosure under FOIA.”329 During the district court hearing, 500 such 
documents were produced, and the court was sufficiently satisfied to grant 
the FBI’s motion for summary judgment.330 However, the court ordered the 
FBI to release to Peltier all documents pertaining to Anna Mae Aquash that 
had not been previously disclosed.331  
The Eighth Circuit affirmed on grounds that although the government 
engaged in misconduct regarding the Peltier case, it was not so “severe and 
extensive as to create a general public interest in disclosure regarding all 
matters related to Peltier's case that overrides the privacy interests of third 
parties” as recognized in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).332 Additionally, an 
insufficient public interest existed in “the potential for disclosure of records 
that would disclose deliberate interference with Peltier's confidential 
attorney-client relationship.”333 
In 2008, Peltier returned to the District Court of Minnesota and brought 
an action requiring the FBI to disclose documents under the Freedom of 
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Information Act (FOIA).334 In an unpublished opinion, the court granted the 
FBI’s motion for summary judgment for all but one category of 
documents.335 Peltier then appealed to the Eighth Circuit, as discussed 
above.336  
In an unpublished opinion in 2009, the Tenth Circuit denied a petition of 
habeas corpus for Peltier and Yorie Von Kahl, also serving multiple life 
sentences for the murder of two federal law enforcement officers, which 
sought specific parole release dates.337 The appellants claimed that § 
235(b)(3) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 gave them the right to the 
issuance of specific parole dates, and their continued incarceration violated 
the Ex Post Facto Clause, Bill of Attainder Clause, and Due Process 
Clause.338 The court articulated that the appellants remained under the 
authority of the Parole Commission, which the two were contesting; 
therefore, the particular section of the Sentencing Reform Act did not 
provide them with the relief they sought.339 
C. Summary 
The long and complex appeals history of the Peltier case highlights the 
legal morass that individuals convicted of very serious federal crimes often 
face. Because the victims of the murders were FBI agents, Peltier’s chances 
for a positive outcome in the appeals process are slight. The power and 
influence of the FBI cannot be understated; according to a December 15, 
2000 CNN article, more than 500 FBI agents and their families marched on 
the White House in response to President Clinton’s willingness to consider 
a pardon for Peltier.340 According to another source, the protest was 
officially sanctioned by the Bureau and was accompanied by the letter from 
FBI Louis Freeh to the President, in which he described Peltier as a 
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“vicious murderer.”341 Clinton continued to consider the pardon but failed 
to sign it before leaving office the following month.342  
The district court’s opinion regarding Peltier’s motion to vacate 
judgment343 is highly emblematic of the legal struggles Peltier experienced 
following his conviction. The Supreme Court’s decision in Agurs ultimately 
hamstrung the efforts of Peltier’s counsel to have the judgment vacated 
because of a failure on the part of the prosecution to disclose exculpatory 
evidence.344 The Brady rule on that issue was fairly straightforward, but 
after the Court qualified the rule in Agurs, much of the clarity was lost.345 
One commentator opined that Agurs 
was an extremely troublesome opinion which endlessly 
befuddled the lower courts and legal commentators. What is of 
concern here is not so much its failed attempt at settling the 
doctrine, but rather the manner in which the Court engaged the 
interpretive process to disavow the original promise of Brady.346 
Indeed, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, appeared to offer hope to 
Peltier when he wrote, 
If there is a duty to respond to a general request of that kind, it 
must derive from the obviously exculpatory character of certain 
evidence in the hands of the prosecutor. But if the evidence is so 
clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives the 
prosecution notice of a duty to produce, that duty should equally 
arise even if no request is made.347 
But Justice Stevens further stated that a key test is whether or not guilt had 
been demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt.348 If such is the case, then 
the exculpatory evidence not disclosed by the prosecution does not warrant 
“justification for a new trial.”349 The materiality inquiry established by the 
Court has been succinctly explained by Professor Jennifer Laurin: 
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;b In United States v. Agurs, the Court erected a three-tiered 
materiality inquiry, which hinged largely on prosecutorial fault. 
Where deliberate misrepresentation or concealment of evidence 
could be shown (not the case in Agurs), the defense burden of 
demonstrating materiality would be at its lowest. Where no such 
misconduct could be shown, but where the undisclosed evidence 
had been specifically requested by the defense, the materiality 
analysis would be stricter. But in a third situation, the one 
actually posed in Agurs, in which there was either no defense 
request for exculpatory evidence or a request only of the most 
general sort, the test for materiality would pose a greater burden 
on the defense: Reversal would occur only if the defendant could 
show that the undisclosed evidence, evaluated in the context of 
the entire trial record, created a “reasonable doubt” of guilt in the 
mind of the reviewing court.350 
Alternatively, if conceding that the district court and the Eighth Circuit 
both applied the standard of Agurs faithfully, the procedural history of the 
Peltier trial at least offered a level of convenience, which the courts no 
doubt found useful in upholding the trial court’s judgment. One of the 
arguments against the Agurs test is the impossibility of the defense asking 
for disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence of which it has no 
knowledge.351 Such was the case with the preliminary ballistics report from 
October 2, 1975.352 Yet, it is precisely this situation for which the Supreme 
Court places the greatest burden of the Agurs test on the defense.353 This 
has led one commentator to advocate a pre-trial in camera review of 
evidence, thus removing favorability of determination from either 
prosecution or defense and placing it in the hands of the trial judge.354 
Despite the clear actions by the government to avoid disclosing exculpatory 
evidence before the Peltier trial, and its determination to “lock” Peltier into 
a conviction,355 the controlling case law gave Peltier and his attorneys 
almost no legal leverage to convince the court that the admission of such 
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exculpatory evidence at trial might have changed the jury’s verdict. The 
virtually unquestioned certainty of guilt by which the district court and the 
Eighth Circuit moved through the Peltier appeals made it nearly impossible 
for him to prevail under the Agurs test. 
In the Eighth Circuit’s opinion following Peltier’s appeal, the court 
considered the recently-decided Bagley test, but determined that the verdict 
probably would not have been different even if the exculpatory evidence 
proffered by Peltier in his motion to the district court had been introduced 
at trial.356 One commentator analyzed the Eighth Circuit opinion and found 
that the Bagley test was misapplied.357 He explained that the two critical 
pieces of evidence regarding the firearms and toolmark identification were 
(1) although the .223 cartridge was extracted from the AR-15 rifle, it may 
not have been fired from it; and (2) testimony indicated that only one AR-
15 was used by AIM activists during the firefight.358 Yet, he argued that  
both of these pieces of data are intricately affected by the 
concealed evidence. First, the October 2 teletype, which stated 
that the .223 caliber rifle tested by Hodge contained a firing pin 
different from that used at the Pine Ridge shoot-out, is damaging 
to the testimony that only one AR-15 was used in the shoot-out. . 
. . Second, the teletype in conjunction with Hodge's testimony 
and the concealed requests for Hodge to compare the .223 casing 
with the Wichita AR-15 demonstrate that not only was the .223 
casing included in the October 2 teletype (and had not been fired 
from Peltier's gun), but that the FBI was, for some reason, 
covering its tracks. Therefore, the concealed evidence also calls 
into question the conclusion that the .223 casing had at some 
time been loaded into the Wichita AR-15.359 
The Eighth Circuit’s misapplication of the Bagley test, then, stems from its 
failure to recognize the impact these two pieces of information might have 
had on the jury’s assessment of the government’s case in the trial. It failed 
to appreciate the possible effects the undisclosed information might have 
had on the prosecution’s case and essentially ignored any impacts it could 
have had on the defense’s argument.  
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The Bagley standard of materiality, by making it more difficult 
to get a new trial, makes it easier for governmental agencies like 
the FBI to play judge and jury, admitting only the evidence they 
see fit to convict whomever they deem to be guilty, while the 
Bagley decision ensures that the victims of this process will be at 
a severe disadvantage in trying to regain their freedom.360 
Another highly troubling aspect of the post-trial appeals process has been 
the repeated denial on the part of the federal courts of Peltier’s right to a 
parole hearing, or at the very least, a scheduling date for a parole hearing. A 
review of the history of his parole hearings reveals that he had certainly 
served the minimum sentence to receive a parole hearing. The 
reconsideration period of fifteen years can only be described as excessive, 
given the Parole Commission’s admission that no direct evidence existed 
for linking Peltier to the agents’ murders. The legal rejection of his 
invocation of the Sentencing Reform Act relegated him to the mercy of an 
unsympathetic Parole Commission, which seemed intent of seeing him 
remain behind bars. Yet, these repeated denials of parole and the scheduling 
of a parole date remain predicated on circumstantial evidence only.  
The history of the Leonard Peltier case contains sufficient legal and 
judicial inconsistencies to warrant analysis and interpretation of potential 
claims for constitutional and human rights violations, which is the focus of 
the remainder of this article.  
V. Possible Constitutional Violations of Leonard Peltier’s Rights 
The Leonard Peltier Defense Offense Committee, based in Fargo, North 
Dakota, is currently pursuing several executive and judicial avenues on 
behalf of Peltier. These include: (1) executive clemency, in which the 
President of the United States would grant a pardon to Peltier; (2) executive 
review, in which the Department of Justice would investigate possible 
prosecutorial misconduct that might result in having the original conviction 
overturned; (3) early release, in which the pursuit of Peltier’s release could 
be guided by various congressional programs designed to alleviate 
overcrowding in federal prisons as well as the high cost of confining 
inmates; and (4) transfer of custody, based primarily on an international 
human rights instrument--Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR).361 Article 1 of the ICCPR protects Peltier’s 
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right to self-determination and would encourage custody of Peltier to be 
transferred to the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians.362 
The Defense Offense Committee also analyzed the constitutional 
violations Peltier suffered, beginning with the FBI’s investigation of AIM 
and continuing to the present. Most, however, focus on the trial itself. The 
Committee prepared an unpaginated eight-page report that was included as 
part of the July 6, 2010 letter from Bruce to Anaya.363 To briefly 
summarize, the Committee argued that Peltier’s rights under Article VI of 
the Constitution, the Fifth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment, and the 
Eighth Amendment have been violated.  
The Article VI violation relates to the extradition of Peltier based on 
coerced testimony and the resulting affidavits of Myrtle Poor Bear; the use 
of potentially fraudulent information in an extradition order may have 
violated the Treaty Clause, and in particular the Webster-Ashburton Treaty 
that governs extradition between the United States and Canada, discussed 
above.364 
The report cited four potential violations of Peltier’s rights under the 
Fifth Amendment, all of which relate to Peltier’s due process rights.365 
First, the Commission alleged that the government engaged in misconduct 
while extraditing Peltier back to the United States, and testimony and 
exhibits of such misconduct were excluded by the district court at trial.366 
Second, the FBI’s engagement with AIM had created a climate of fear 
among AIM members, which led to Peltier’s flight to Canada. Yet, 
testimony on this topic was likewise excluded by the district court at 
trial.367 Third, testimony and evidence prejudicial to Peltier was admitted 
during the trial.368 This included all autopsy photographs of the murdered 
agents and FBI academy graduation photographs of the two agents.369 Also 
admitted was evidence of Peltier’s previous attempted murder charge, 
weapons unrelated to the firefight that came from the exploded vehicle near 
Wichita, Peltier’s purported flight to Canada from a motor home in Oregon 
despite no one ever actually having seen him there, his possession of 
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unrelated weapons when he was arrested in Canada, and a variety of deadly 
weapons found on the Rosebud Reservation that could not be linked to 
him.370 Fourth, his defense requested a mistrial on several occasions 
throughout the trial and was denied each time.371 Much of this had to do 
with jury instructions relating to prejudicial material, and to facts alleged by 
the government that were contrary to witness testimony or wholly lacked 
testimony.372 
The possible Sixth Amendment violations were more diverse, including 
violations of Peltier’s (1) right to compulsory process; (2) right to confront 
witnesses; (3) right to be made aware of the nature of accusations; (4) right 
to an impartial jury; (5) and right to a public trial. The compulsory process 
relates to Myrtle Poor Bear and Jimmy Eagle both being subpoenaed by the 
defense but not being allowed to testify before the jury at trial.373 The 
violation of the Confrontation Clause may be one of the most significant in 
the case. Brady was the controlling case at this time, yet a variety of sources 
of exculpatory evidence–-the testimony of Myrtle Poor Bear and Jimmy 
Eagle; the coerced testimony of Anderson, Draper, and Brown; the radio 
transmission reports of the red pickup; the alleged sightings of Peltier and 
Eagle through a rifle scope; pathologists’ reports; and the firearms and 
toolmark identification–-were excluded from trial, and some of this 
evidence was unknown to the defense because the prosecution did not 
disclose it.374 The possible violation of the right to be made aware of the 
nature of the accusations against him related to Peltier being uninformed 
that the charge of aiding and abetting led to his conviction.375 Peltier’s 
defense argued that he was not extradited on the aiding and abetting charge 
and sought to have the judge issue appropriate instructions to the jury.376 
Yet, the judge allowed the prosecution to raise the aiding and abetting 
theory during closing arguments:  
Now, you will note that I didn’t say we have to prove Leonard 
Peltier pulled the trigger on either of the deaths because the law 
does not require that. All we have to show is that he was 
                                                                                                                 
 370. Id.  
 371. Id.  
 372. Id. 
 373. Id.  
 374. Id.  
 375. Id.  
 376. Id. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol38/iss1/2
No. 1] THE LEONARD PELTIER CASE 83 
 
 
responsible, whether it was by pulling the trigger or by some 
other method or means.377 
The Commission based its argument for the lack of an impartial jury was 
argued on the jury’s composition--the jury was all white--its sequestration 
throughout the trial, the judge’s inadequate instructions before 
deliberations, and the judge’s denial of the jury’s two requests to re-hear 
certain testimony.378 Finally, Peltier’s right to a public trial was arguably 
violated when on the day of the reporting of the verdict, the judge chose to 
exclude the public from the courtroom, including Peltier’s family.379 
The sole Eighth Amendment violation alleged was for cruel and unusual 
punishment. The Commission argued that while Robideau and Butler were 
acquitted, Peltier was found guilty and sentenced to two consecutive life 
terms, and this conviction was based solely on circumstantial evidence.380 
In summary, there are a number of troubling inconsistencies concerning 
how the trial was handled and possible misconduct on the part of the 
government that effectively prevented Leonard Peltier from receiving a fair 
trial. Particularly disturbing is the fact that, despite the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Brady, a significant amount of exculpatory and potentially 
exculpatory evidence was not disclosed by the prosecution, thus hindering 
the defense’s case. The lack of opportunity to have Myrtle Poor Bear and 
Jimmy Eagle testify before the jury is just one example of this failure to 
disclose. Also, considering that two AIM members were indicted and then 
acquitted on similar murder charges, the sentence given to Peltier raises the 
issue of cruel and unusual punishment. When coupled with a failure on the 
part of the government to apprise him of the nature of accusations against 
him, and thus be able to present to the jury an aiding and abetting theory of 
which to find Peltier guilty, a violation of cruel and unusual punishment 
becomes even more important to consider.  
Finally, given Peltier’s indigenous status and his affiliation with AIM, 
was racial discrimination a motivating force behind the trial-related 
behavior exhibited by the government? Did Peltier’s status as an indigenous 
person in the United States play a significant role in preventing him from 
possibly getting a fair trial and receiving a cruel and unusual punishment? If 
there were violations of his fundamental freedoms as an American, is there 
a positive correlation between the violations and his status as an indigenous 
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person, an American Indian? To address this aspect of the case, it is 
necessary to turn to a consideration of whether Peltier’s human rights as an 
indigenous person were violated, as presently defined by customary 
international law.  
VI. Possible International Human Rights Violations  
A. Previous International Involvement of the Peltier Case 
In December 1976, Peltier challenged his extradition from Canada before 
the U.N. Human Rights Committee, the committee responsible for hearing 
complaints relating to the ICCPR, a covenant that the United States has 
ratified.381 This was the first time an extradition matter had been brought 
before the committee.382 Peltier challenged the extradition on grounds that 
the statements by Myrtle Poor Beach were coerced, and also “on the 
grounds that the shootings had taken place on sovereign Indian territory and 
that the offence [sic] was of a political nature because of his involvement in 
the American Indian Movement for National Liberation.”383 Among the 
ICCPR provisions that Peltier invoked were Article 1, on self-
determination, and Article 13, which provides safeguards against 
expulsion.384 The Human Rights Committee never discussed the specific 
applicability of the provisions invoked.385 Rather, they gave the entire 
matter “short shrift,” declaring that the communication was inadmissible, in 
part because it drew on events that took place before the treaty took effect 
in Canada, and in part because Peltier had failed to exhaust his domestic 
legal remedies.386 
In 1984, at the height of the Reagan-Gorbachev Cold War, the U.N. Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 
welcomed seventeen newly elected expert members to its twenty-six-
member board and convened in Geneva.387 The meeting agenda included 
human rights violations in certain countries, the status of indigenous 
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peoples, slavery, states of emergency, as well as other matters.388 Under the 
heading of human rights violations, the Soviet Union and the United States 
each submitted three resolutions “that the Sub-Commission found too 
controversial to consider.”389 The United States introduced resolutions 
concerning the plight of Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov, the Swedish 
World War II hero Raoul Wallenberg who disappeared after being taken 
prisoner by the Russian Army, and Jews in the Soviet Union.390 The Soviet 
Union countered with resolutions regarding the situation in Northern 
Ireland, President Reagan’s remarks relating to the launching of a nuclear 
attack, and the plight of Leonard Peltier.391 The Sub-Commission managed 
to avoid dealing with resolutions in a rather convenient fashion: “It decided 
that [the U.S. and Soviet resolutions] would be considered only after all the 
others and then ran out of time before debate could begin on the political 
resolutions.”392 
B. Potential International Human Rights Violations of Leonard Peltier 
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racism 
and Discrimination (ICERD) is a particularly important international treaty 
for Peltier’s case. First, the treaty entered into force on January 4, 1969--
well before the events in question occurred--and as the United States had 
ratified the convention, the U.S. government is legally bound to its 
provisions.393 Article 2 defines the State’s responsibility in eliminating 
racism and discrimination; Article 2(1)(a) states that “[e]ach State Party 
undertakes to engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination against 
persons, groups of persons or institutions and to en sure that all public 
authorities and public institutions, national and local, shall act in conformity 
with this obligation.”394 Article 2(1)(b) is also pertinent and says, “Each 
State Party undertakes not to sponsor, defend or support racial 
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 393. Although the United States signed ICERD on September 28, 1966, it did not ratify it 
until October 21, 1994. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
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discrimination by any persons or organizations.”395 These provisions make 
it clear that any signatory state must not support any form of racial 
discrimination nor allow public institutions to engage in such behavior. 
Article 5 outlines individual rights, including three rights on point: (a) ‘[t]he 
right to equal treatment before the tribunals and all other organs 
administering justice;” (d)(ix) “[t]he right to freedom of peaceful assembly 
and association;’ and (e)(vi) “[t]he right to equal participation in cultural 
activities.”396  
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the 
U.N. body responsible for dealing with complaints under the Convention, 
has “early warning measures” and “urgent action procedures” to address 
current problems that may become more serious if immediate action is not 
taken.397 Peltier could potentially use these measures and procedures to 
seek direct review by CERD. Peltier could also include arguments based on 
the provisions of ICERD in a petition for executive clemency or executive 
review. 
Another international covenant that could be helpful in arguing Peltier’s 
case is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
Although the Covenant was open for ratification in December 1966, it did 
not enter into force until March 23, 1976.398 This occurred after the Pine 
Ridge Reservation murders but before Peltier was extradited from Canada 
and before he stood trial. The Covenant has been ratified by the U.S. 
government, thus binding it legally to the Covenant’s provisions. In 
addition, as with ICERD, this instrument reflects international customary 
law and current international legal norms, and therefore can be invoked in 
an argument of the possible violations of Leonard Peltier’s human rights. 
As with ICERD, Article 2 of the ICCPR defines the duties of signatory 
states in ensuring the rights of individuals. Article 2(3)(b) states, “To ensure 
that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto 
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, 
                                                                                                                 
 395. Id. 
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Early Warning and Urgent Action Procedures, 71st Sess., Aug. 2007, U.N. Doc. A/62/18, 
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or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the 
State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy.”399 This obliges 
the State to ensure that good-faith efforts are made to serve justice and to 
ensure everyone has the right to participate in a just system. Part III of the 
ICCPR consists of twenty-two articles that articulate individual rights.400  
The individual rights listed that are relevant to the Peltier case are Article 
7, for the prevention of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or 
punishment; Article 9(2), which requires that arrestees be promptly 
informed of all charges against them; Article 14, particularly subsections 1, 
2, and 3(e), which protects the right to a fair trial; Article 21, which 
includes the right to peaceful assembly; Article 22, covering the right to 
freedom of association; Article 26, protecting equal treatment under the law 
and equal protection under the law without discrimination; and Article 27, 
discussing minorities’ right “to enjoy their own culture”.401 
It is worth pointing out two recent decisions of the U.N. Human Rights 
Committee under the ICCPR regarding the unfair trials of individuals. The 
Human Rights Committee recommended that Russian citizen Konstantin 
Babkin, who was tried for murder and given an unfair trial, be given both 
compensation and a retrial.402 The State responded by stating that the 
Committee’s recommendations had been forwarded to all of its high courts 
“to ensure that this type of violation will not occur again.”403 In the matter 
of A. Aliev of Ukraine, who had been denied a fair trial by not having 
counsel present, the Human Rights Committee recommended that 
consideration be given to an early release.404 In this instance, the State 
strongly disagreed with Aliev’s allegations, claiming they had no basis and 
that he had been tried fairly405 
Another U.N. convention that may be pertinent to the Peltier case is the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, which entered into force on June 26, 1987 and 
                                                                                                                 
 399. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
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 402. Rep. of the U.N. Human Rights Comm. on Individual Communications, Human 
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was ratified by the United States on October 21, 1994.406 Again, although 
this ratification occurred after the events in question, the convention 
follows international customary law and legal norms and is legally binding 
on signatories. This convention, rather than outlining specific individual 
rights, defines a variety of responsibilities on the signatory states to protect 
its people from torture. Article 1 of the convention, which defines torture, is 
relevant to the Peltier case: 
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him 
or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of 
any kind.407 
The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples also has 
important implications as an international human rights instrument in 
relation to the Peltier case. Adopted in 2007 and endorsed by the United 
States in 2010, the Declaration reflects international customary law and is 
the first international human rights instrument created by the U.N. that 
deals explicitly with the rights and freedoms of indigenous peoples.408 The 
fact that Leonard Peltier is an American Indian cannot be overemphasized, 
given his role in AIM and the FBI’s campaign to suppress the activities of 
AIM. Therefore, Peltier’s fate cannot be severed from or considered wholly 
independently of the long history of discrimination and marginalization of 
American Indians by the U.S. government.409 In this context a few facts that 
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indicate incidents of discrimination against Peltier are worth reiterating. As 
previously discussed, there is a school of thought within the FBI that views 
American Indians as conquered people and the federal police as a 
colonizing force.410 During the 1960s and into the 1970s, the FBI responded 
forcefully to virtually any activity by minority groups that it considered 
subversive.411 Peltier was charged with attempted murder of police officer 
in Milwaukee in 1972, yet witnesses stated that two off-duty policemen 
jumped Peltier in a bar and beat him severely, leading to the charges against 
him.412 During Peltier’s trial in California for his prison escape, the trial 
judge allegedly said at sidebar, “I have lived and gone to school with those 
kind of people all my life so I know those kind of people.”413 Paul Benson, 
the judge who presided over Peltier’s murder trial, called him a disservice 
to his people.414 This suggests a stereotypical view of American Indians as 
second-class, vanquished peoples who understand their position in the 
hierarchy of American society, and those who attempt to change that status 
by uplifting them only make their situation worse. Benson’s point of view 
is consistent with many government officials who sought to discredit AIM 
by emphasizing the fact that even among American Indians AIM had its 
detractors and those who disagreed with its ideology. As Gerald Vizenor, a 
White Earth Chippewa elder, once stated with regard to AIM, 
The confrontation idiom means punching out the symbolic 
adversary of racism and oppression at the front door, with the 
press present, and walking out the back door. Those who 
followed the ideology of confrontation were in conflict with 
those who believed that confrontation should lead to negotiation 
and institutional changes. The negotiation idiom means punching 
out the adversary at the front door with the press present but 
waiting around for an invitation to return and grind out some 
changes...The militant [AIM] leaders are dedicated men who 
                                                                                                                 
WARD CHURCHILL, A LITTLE MATTER OF GENOCIDE: HOLOCAUST AND DENIAL IN THE 
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have given many years of their lives to a cause, but it takes more 
than a rifle and the symbolic willingness to die to bring about 
institutional changes that will benefit tribal people.415 
These examples are not random, but part of a larger pattern of 
discrimination to which Peltier, as well as other members of AIM (and 
many American Indian activists not associated with AIM), was subjected 
throughout the period of time covered in this paper. The contemporary 
standards of customary international law are clear with regard to 
governmental practices of discrimination.  
The United Nations’ human rights treaties and declarations all share a 
powerful anti-discrimination orientation. The right to be free from 
discrimination is as strong as any other human rights expounded upon in 
international human rights instruments. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, adopted by the U.N. in 1948, soundly rejects discrimination 
in Articles 2 and 7.416 As mentioned above, the ICCPR does so with equal 
emphasis in Article 26.417 Of course, ICERD is devoted in its entirety to the 
eradication of discrimination in all its forms. Regional instruments, such as 
Article 2 of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man and 
Article 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights, likewise reject 
discrimination broadly. The U.N. Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous 
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Peoples is very strongly anti-discriminatory; denunciations of 
discrimination occur four times in the Declaration’s preamble.418 In 
summary, Leonard Peltier’s right to be free from discrimination has been 
systematically violated by the U.S. government-–at least three years before 
the firefight at the Jumping Bull compound and right up to the present, 
because of his status as an American Indian and a member of AIM. 
Although the Declaration is not legally binding on signatories, its 
adherence to principles of international customary law can serve as a guide 
for assessing possible human rights violations not only of indigenous 
peoples but also of individuals who are indigenous. There are ancillary and 
special rights that attend an indigenous person and can be denied because of 
discrimination; some of these, which are articulated in the Declaration, 
merit mentioning as well. Although the Declaration is primarily an 
instrument of collective, rather than individual rights, its spirit speaks to the 
importance of community and cultural sharing that is absolutely critical to 
the survival of indigenous peoples. It also emphasizes the relationship of 
indigenous peoples to their land and resources (Peltier’s involvement in 
AIM centered around preserving Indian lands and resources, see discussion, 
supra).419 It further contemplates the right of self-determination of 
indigenous peoples, through preservation of life styles, culture, traditions, 
lands, and indigenous institutions. Article 37 of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples guarantees that treaties 
will be honored and protected by States.420 Violations of provisions of the 
Declaration generally result in the cultural destruction and loss of self-
identity of indigenous peoples.  
In addition, Peltier’s status as a political prisoner can be considered in 
light of the Declaration, given that (1) he is indigenous; (2) he was pursued 
                                                                                                                 
 418. Preamble, United Nations DECLARATION on the RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, 
G.A. Res. 61/295, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007). As well as in Articles 
2 (free from all forms of discrimination), 8 (redress for propaganda of a discriminatory 
nature), 9 (free from discrimination to live in an indigenous village), 14 (preventing 
indigenous children from being discriminated against in schools), 15 (preventing 
discrimination against culture and tradition), 16 (preventing discrimination against 
indigenous peoples’ languages), 21 (preventing discrimination in the pursuit of economic 
development), 22 (prevention of violence and/or discrimination against indigenous women 
and children), 24 (preventing discrimination of access to social and health services), 29 
(preventing discrimination with regard to the conservation of indigenous peoples’ 
environments), and 46 (stating that the Declaration is non-discriminatory in character. 
 419. See note 55, supra, and discussion supra Part III.A. 
 420. United Nations DECLARATION on the RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, G.A. Res. 
61/295, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
92 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
 
 
by the FBI in part because of his involvement in a “subversive” 
organization; and (3) was not accorded a fair trial with regard to the charges 
brought against him. His case can therefore be compared generally with the 
case of Lori Berenson, an American activist who was convicted on 
terrorism charges in Peru in the late 1990s.421 Although Berenson was not 
an indigenous person, she was connected, according to Peruvian authorities, 
with a subversive domestic organization, and there is controversy 
surrounding whether she received a fair trial.422 After convictions in both 
military and civil courts in Peru, Berenson appealed her case to the Inter-
American system for protecting human rights.423 The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights received a petition from Berenson’s counsel 
in 1998, reviewed the case, and in 2002, after Peru had failed to act on its 
recommendations, referred the case to the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights.424 
Berenson was arrested in November 1995 in Lima, for allegedly 
organizing a domestic terrorist attack against the Peruvian government.425 
The charges brought against her by military officials were not made plain to 
her, nor was her lawyer allowed “to examine evidence or cross-examine 
witnesses.”426 The Inter-American Court described the military trial as 
follows: 
The military trial was held on January 11, 1996, at the Chorrillos 
Military Base, in a type of room, like a tent, where there were 
several armed men in uniform. While the judgment was being 
read, the judges and prosecutors had their faces covered with 
balaclava helmets. The trial lasted “a couple of hours” and 
consisted merely in the reading of the judgment. At this trial she 
was sentenced to life imprisonment; she was not questioned; she 
was only asked if she would appeal the sentence. Even though 
her lawyer was present, she could not consult him to take the 
decision to appeal, although she could signal to him.427 
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Following a series of appeals and motions on the part of Berenson’s 
lawyers, in 2000, the Military Supreme Court found that due to an error, 
part of Berenson’s sentence should be annulled, and the case was referred 
to civil court.428 The following June, Berenson was convicted of terrorism 
in civil court in Peru.429 Her lawyers brought the case before the Inter-
American Commission, alleging multiple human rights violations, 
including right to humane treatment (Article 5 under the American 
Convention) and right to a fair trial (Article 8).430 The Inter-American Court 
found that her right to a fair trial had been violated by the military court, 
and that conditions in prison violated her right to humane treatment; 
however, the Court did not find that any of her rights were violated by the 
civil trial, and therefore, while ruling that she was entitled to compensation, 
the Court did not rule that she should freed from prison.431 The important 
point here is that had Berenson only faced a military tribunal, the Court 
would have demanded her release on the ground that her right to a free trial 
had been violated; one would expect that the Inter-American system would 
likewise find that Peltier’s right to a fair trial had been violated as well. 
Table I provides a quick reference to potential international human rights 
violations suffered by Leonard Peltier along with the applicable U.S.-
ratified international human rights instruments and the Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 428. Id. ¶ 88(44). 
 429. Id. ¶ 88(69). 
 430. May, supra note 423, at 880. 
 431. Tim Curry, Nerina Cevra & Erin Palmer, Updates from the Regional Human Rights 
System, 12 HUM. RTS. BRIEF, no. 2, 2005 at 22, 26, available at http://digitalcommons.wcl. 
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A. Morisette, The Lori Berenson Case: Proper Treatment of a Foreign Terrorist Under the 
Peruvian Criminal Justice System, 26 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 81 (2002) (arguing that 
Berenson was indeed a terrorist who got what she deserved, that she was convicted fairly on 
the basis of law and evidence, and that the United States should not interfere in the matter). 
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 As an American Indian 
and member of AIM, 
Peltier was likely targeted 
















Peltier, not permitted the 
same defense as Robideau 
and Butler, was given two 
consecutive life sentences 
based solely on 
circumstantial evidence, 
some of which may have 
been tampered with. 
 
 






Articles 10, 11 
  The FBI seemed intent on 
“locking” Peltier into 
convictions for the 
murders after Robideau 
and Butler were acquitted; 
exculpatory evidence was 
withheld by the 
government; Peltier not 
given opportunity to 
confront certain witnesses. 
Additional possible Fifth 
and Sixth Amendment 
violations (discussed, 
supra) interfered with his 
right to be tried fairly. 
 
In addition, the strongest 
evidence offered against 
Peltier – the firearms and 
toolmark identification – 
was fraught with 
problems; the technique 
itself has now been 
seriously called into 
question for its lack of a 
clear scientific foundation. 
 










  Peltier’s association with 
AIM, a legal organization, 
brought him under the 
scrutiny of the FBI, which 
intended to suppress the 
movement. 
 
Right to be 
informed of 
charges after arrest 
  
Article 9(2) 
   Peltier claims that he was 
never apprised of the 
aiding and abetting 
charges, only the murder 
charges. 
 











 Peltier’s status as an 
American Indian played a 
role in whatever lack of 
justice he may have 
experienced; his activity in 
AIM to preserve aspects of 
Indian culture and 
tradition was criminalized 
by FBI efforts to suppress 
AIM. 
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VII. Conclusions: The Elements of a Case for Executive Clemency Based on 
International Human Rights Violations 
A. Executive Clemency and Executive Review 
Two of the four possible remedies posited by the Peltier Defense Offense 
Committee--executive clemency and executive review--are considered here; 
from the perspective of international human rights, they provide the most 
appropriate avenues to achieving justice for Leonard Peltier. 
A person may seek executive clemency through “pardon, reprieve, 
commutation of sentence, or remission of fine.”432 In Peltier’s case a 
commutation of sentence might be the best path to take. The requirements 
for commutation are presented in § 1.3 of the Rules Governing Petitions for 
Executive Clemency: “No petition for commutation of sentence, including 
remission of fine, should be filed if other forms of judicial or administrative 
relief are available, except upon a showing of exceptional 
circumstances.”433 One can safely say that, given Peltier’s long and painful 
journey through the appellate process, having three times been denied 
certiorari by the Supreme Court, that other forms of judicial relief are no 
longer available. 
Executive review would compel the U.S. Attorney General to review the 
history of the Peltier case, with emphasis on the trial, and determine if 
sufficient misconduct or abuse of discretion or other procedural errors 
worked in such a way as to result in a verdict that would not have been 
rendered had the trial been fair and just.434 A successful outcome of an 
executive review would be to have the original judgment vacated and a new 
trial ordered. If Peltier is acquitted, he will be acknowledged as innocent, 
and the court ruling would exonerate him; executive clemency, on the other 
hand, would not necessarily provide such exoneration, but may simply 
proclaim that his sentence has been commuted and he becomes a free man. 
In other words, there may be no acknowledgment of innocence or of having 
been the victim of injustice in a commutation of sentence. Amnesty 
International, in a 1992 report, recommended a new trial. After describing 
how the extradition papers contained “testimony from a mentally disturbed 
Indian woman,” the report stated, “These and other factors have led 
                                                                                                                 
 432. 28 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2013) 
 433. Id. 
434 See http://www.freedomarchives.org/pipermail/ppnews_freedomarchives.org/2009-
Setpember/002450.html 
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Amnesty International to conclude that justice would best be served if the 
United States authorities were to grant Leonard Peltier a retrial.”435 
Whereas obtaining a successful executive review may not be as difficult 
as obtaining executive clemency, the risks, however, are greater. A new 
trial would not necessarily ensure a fair trial, and Peltier would have several 
factors likely working against him: the reality that the crime still involves 
the deaths of two FBI agents, and if Peltier is acquitted no one would be 
held responsible for the crime; that more than thirty years have elapsed 
since the trial would make it difficult to call reliable witnesses or introduce 
new testimony (beyond the materials obtained by Peltier through the 
FOIA); that it would no doubt cause a firestorm of protest from the FBI (not 
unlike the protest sparked when President Clinton considered clemency for 
Peltier in late 2000); and the stress of a new trial may be unduly damaging 
to Peltier physically. 
Therefore, the most prudent course of action is to seek a commutation of 
sentence through executive clemency. This would wipe the conviction off 
Peltier’s record and restore his freedom without conditions or another trial. 
With that in mind, what follows is a summary of the critical points to be 
included in a letter supporting a petition for executive clemency that would 
highlight the injustices suffered by Peltier from the standpoint of 
international human rights norms. 
B. Executive Clemency for Leonard Peltier: The International Human 
Rights Perspective 
As discussed above, President Clinton reviewed a petition for executive 
clemency for Peltier but chose not to sign it.436 The effort for a successful 
petition for clemency continues. The Leonard Peltier Defense Offense 
Committee has prepared a letter online to President Barack Obama seeking 
executive clemency; the screen has fields for individuals to sign.437 As 
recently as October 21, 2010, an email containing a letter from Peltier was 
forwarded to Professor S. James Anaya in which Peltier mentioned new 
legal action his team of attorneys is preparing.438 In support of a petition for 
                                                                                                                 
 435. AMNESTY INT’L, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: 
THE AMERICAS 5 (1992) available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR01/001/ 
1992/en/d903956b-edbf-11dd-a95b-fd9a617f028f/amr010011992en.pdf. 
 436. Laurier, supra note 342. 
 437. See Executive Clemency for Leonard Peltier, IPETITIONS http://www.ipetitions.com/ 
petition/peltier_clemency2008/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2013). 
 438. E-mail from George Galvis to Tony Gonzales et al. (Oct. 21, 2010, 10:46 CST) (on 
file with author). 
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executive clemency, an argument, from an international perspective, that 
claims that Peltier’s human rights have been violated, might be organized in 
a letter that would contain the following: 
 
PART I: BACKGROUND 
! An introductory paragraph stating support for executive 
clemency; 
! A paragraph discussing the essential facts of the case; 
! A paragraph discussing the FBI’s position regarding the case; 
! A paragraph or two listing the major points of controversy; 
! A paragraph or two summarizing the post-conviction case law. 
 
PART II: POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
(Emphasis in discussing these violations should focus on Peltier’s status 
as an indigenous person and activist and the racial discrimination he has 
suffered as a result, as well as his association with an organization 
considered to be “subversive” by the U.S. government; appropriate treaties 
and the Declaration, as discussed, should be invoked with the presentation 
of each violated right). 
! Equal treatment under the law; 
! Prevention of cruel and unusual punishment; 
! Right to a fair trial; 
! Right to assembly and association; 
! Right to be informed of all charges after arrest; 
! Right to participation in cultural life. 
 
PART III: CONCLUDING STATEMENT 
The concluding statement should emphasize: 
! the importance of international human rights instruments in the 
contemporary world of jurisprudence; 
! the need for the recognition of equal justice for indigenous 
peoples and indigenous individuals; 
! how justice will be served for Peltier if executive clemency is 
granted.  
C. Final Thoughts 
Leonard Peltier’s case has gained worldwide attention, and many 
prominent individuals and organizations continue to press for his release. In 
addition to artists, scholars, and lawyers, the current list of supporters 
includes eight Nobel Prize winners, including Nelson Mandela (now 
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deceased), the Dalai Lama, Rigoberta Menchu, Tum, and Mearaid Maguire; 
the Belgium and Italian parliaments; civil rights leaders, including Jesse 
Jackson and Jim Silk; human rights organizations such as Amnesty 
International, Indigenous Women’s Network, Human Rights Commission 
of Spain, and Veterans for Peace; religious organizations including the 
World Council of Churches, National Association of Christians and Jews, 
and the Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns; and forty-four Native 
American tribes, organizations, and tribal leaders.439 
The weight of the evidence indicates that Peltier was pursued by the FBI 
because of his association with AIM, that he was extradited from Canada 
using information based in part on false testimony, that significant 
exculpatory evidence was withheld by the government before and during 
his trial, that he was unfairly convicted of the murders of FBI agents Coler 
and Williams, and that he was denied, during his appeals process, being 
allowed to introduce withheld evidence as well as timely parole hearings. 
One commentator who believes that Peltier may very well have murdered 
the two agents, nevertheless has decried the treatment he received from the 
government and the abuse of justice that resulted: 
The claim by Kamook Nichols that Leonard Peltier boasted of 
killing the agents at Oglala has received wide attention, mostly 
because Peltier’s detractors have said it justifies his conviction 
                                                                                                                 
 439. See Current and Past Supporters of Clemency for Leonard Peltier, LEONARD 
PELTIER DEFENSE OFFENSE COMMITTEE, http://www.whoisleonardpeltier.info/LEGAL/ 
uploads/supporters.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2013). The Native American organizations and 
tribal leaders include: Assembly of First Nations of Canada, Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, 
Cherokee Nation, Chief Arvol Looking Horse, Coyote Valley Tribal Council, Duckwater 
Shoshone Tribe, Forest County Potawatomi Community, First Nations School Association, 
Great Lakes Inter-Tribal Council, Inc., Greenville Rancheria Tribal Council, Honor the 
Earth, Howonquet Indian Council of the Smith River Rancheria, Indian Treaty Council, Kaw 
Tribe of Oklahoma, Lac Courte Oreilles Tribal Governing Board, Lakota/Dakota/Nakota 
General Council, Los Coyotes Reservation, Lower Brule Sioux Tribal Council, Mashpee 
Wampanoag Indian Tribal Council, Inc., National Congress of American Indians, Navajo 
Nation, Nez Perce Tribal Executive Committee, Northern Arapaho Business Council, Oglala 
Sioux Tribe, Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin, Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma, Prairie Band 
Potawatomi Tribal Council, Prairie Island Indian Committee, Prairie Island Tribal Council, 
Puyallup Tribal Council, Rohnerville Rancheria Tribal Council, Saginaw Chippewa Indian 
Tribe of Michigan, San Pasqual Band of Mission Tribal Council, Schaghticoke Tribal Nation 
of Kent, Connecticut, Inc., Smith River Rancheria Tribal Council, Standing Rock Sioux 
Tribe, Tohono O’Odham Legislative Council, Tonkawa Tribal Council, Turtle Mountain 
Band of Chippewa Indians, United Auburn Indian Community of the Auburn Rancheria, 
Upper Sioux Community, Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head, Westbank First Nation, and 
Winnebago Tribal Council. 
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and will justify denying him parole. . . The argument is spurious. 
It brushes aside the fact that Peltier was denied the right to a fair 
trial and so could not argue to a jury, as Dino Butler and Bob 
Robideau did, that even if they found he had killed the agents, 
the government was more guilty than he. . . . I have never met 
Leonard Peltier, and I doubt I would much like him if I did. I 
also believe it is far more probable than not that he finished off 
the agents while one of them begged for their lives. But the man 
has been imprisoned thirty years in consequence of being 
railroaded in the most obscene way, and that is suffering enough, 
particularly since his railroaders have never been jailed a day. He 
should be set free.440 
When the puzzle of his arrest, trial, conviction, and appeals process is 
assembled as completely and accurately as possible, the simple yet 
disturbing question posed by distinguished Professor Blanche Wiesen 
Cook, more than a decade ago, resonates profoundly: “Why is Leonard 
Peltier still in prison?”441 
Perhaps it is most appropriate to close with Peltier’s own words, 
reflecting his status as an indigenous person in the United States and the 
discrimination indigenous people frequently face when confronted with an 
often hostile judicial system: “Innocence is the weakest defense. Innocence 
has a single voice that can only say over and over again, ‘I didn’t do it.’ 
Guilt has a thousand voices, all of them lies.”442 
  
                                                                                                                 
 440. STEVE HENDRICKS, THE UNQUIET GRAVE: THE FBI AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL 
OF INDIAN COUNTRY 368-69 (2006). 
 441. Blanche Wiesen Cook et al., The Genesis of the Declaration: A Fresh Examination, 
11 PACE INT’L L. REV. 27, 50 (1999) (panel discussion). 
 442. LEONARD PELTIER, PRISON WRITINGS: MY LIFE IS MY SUN DANCE xxiii (Harvey 
Arden ed., 2000). 
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